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Activism As Restraint: Lessons from Criminal
Procedure
Stephen F. Smith*
I. Introduction
Much has been made in recent years about the puzzling chasm that
separates constitutional law, on the one hand, and criminal procedure, on the
other-what one leading commentator terms, accurately enough, a
"dissociation of legal sensibility."' All too often the Supreme Court has
approached criminal procedure questions without regard to considerations
that are widely recognized as relevant to constitutional interpretation, such as
textual meaning, original intention, and historical practice 2 Rather than
trouble itself with such considerations, the debate in criminal procedure tends
to focus exclusively on results-specifically, on the perceived wisdom or
fairness of all sorts of procedural innovations in the criminal justice system.3
This is very odd because, thanks to the Warren Court, American criminal
procedure is constitutional law, and remains so even after thirty years of
conservative revisionism.
By now it is common knowledge that almost the entire field of criminal
procedure, formerly within the more or less exclusive province of the several
States, has been constitutionalized. This was the famous-or, if you prefer,
infamous---"Criminal Procedure Revolution." 4  Now it is only slightly
exaggerated to say that all of the rules that really count concerning the
process of investigating and prosecuting crimes come from the pages of the
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Earl Dudley, Richard Fallon, Kim Forde-Mazrui, Rick Garnett, Beth Garrett, John Jeffries, Mike
Klarman, Daryl Levinson, Saul Levmore, Paul Mahoney, Dave Martin, Alan Meese, Jim Ryan,
Mike Seidman, Paul Stephan, and Bill Stuntz. I grant each total absolution for any heresies or
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grateful to participants in faculty workshops at George Mason University School of Law, the
University of Michigan School of Law, and the University of Virginia School of Law for lively and
informative discussions of this project.
1. Donald Dripps, Akdil Amar on Crininal Procedure and Constitutional Lmv "Here I Go Down
That Wrong RoadAgain," 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1561 (1996).
2. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRm. L
REv. 1123, 1132 (1996).
3. See Dripps, supra note 1, at 1560 (arguing that the Court decides criminal procedure cases
based on "'fundamental faimess!]' qualified by interest-balancing" and that this approach "has
generated an unprincipled and inconsistent body of law").
4. See generally Carol Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466,2466-67 n.5 (1996).
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United States Reports, not state and federal rules of criminal procedure.5 I
readily add my voice to the growing chorus that "the Constitution needs to be
put back into criminal procedure."
6
One key benefit of bridging the artificial divide between constitutional
law and criminal procedure would be to force courts and scholars to take
seriously the normative implications of an expansive role for the federal
judiciary in criminal procedure. After all, one of the dominant themes of the
constitutional law literature over the last two generations has been coming to
grips with the vexing "counter-majoritarian difficulty," Alexander Bickel's
famous, if somewhat dated, phrase describing the tension that arises in a
democracy when an unaccountable judiciary sets aside actions of the
politically accountable branches of government.7 To be sure, the bulk of the
scholarly debate has been aimed at minimizing or explaining away the
counter-majoritarian difficulty and therefore justifying Supreme Court
adventurism in pursuit of ends that often could not readily be achieved
through the legislative process. 8  Still, the relevant point here is that
constitutional law theorists recognize on some level that broad exercises of
judicial power require special justification in a representative democracy
such as ours.
This recognition has been conspicuously absent in criminal procedure,
where broad exercises of federal judicial power are largely taken for granted.
In Professor Akhil Amar's memorable phrasing, both courts and many
criminal procedure scholars have treated the Constitution not as a binding
document with the force of law, but rather as a "ventriloquist's dummy that
can be made to say anything the puppeteer likes."9 A poignant example can
be found in the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.
5. This has bookstore implications for students: all first-year law students are required to purchase
a copy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but, as far as I know, no teacher of Criminal Procedure
mandates the purchase of the corresponding criminal rules. The real pedagogical use of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, then, would seem to be to break the monotony of reading an endless
stream of Supreme Court opinions and casebook notes.
6. Dripps, supra note 1, at 1561; see also, e.g., Amar, supra note 2, at 1132; William J. Stuntz, The
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 3-4 & n.l
(1997). Putting the Constitution back into criminal procedure would require deconstitutionalizing
certain areas of criminal procedure and expanding constitutional protection in others because prior
constitutional decisions, both expanding and contracting constitutional rights, grounded on fairness
concerns and interest-balancing, might not withstand rigorous constitutional analysis.
7. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITIcS 16 (1962); see generally Suzanna Sherry, Too Clever by HafC" The Problem with
Novelty in Constitutional Law, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 921, 921 (2001) ("[T]he 'counter-majoritarian
difficulty' remains-some forty years after its christening-a central theme in constitutional
scholarship. Indeed, one might say that reconciling judicial review and democratic institutions is the
goal of almost every major constitutional scholar writing today." (footnote omitted)).
8. See generally Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and Experience, 72 B.U.
L. REv. 747, 747 (1992) (noting that modem liberal constitutional theory had its genesis in "the need
to defend the Warren Court's accomplishments against intellectual assaults first from the proponents of
'legal process' theory and then from political conservatives").
9. Amar, supra note 2, at 1130.
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Like all the other rights conferred by the Sixth Amendment, the right to
trial by jury applies "[i]n all criminal prosecutions."' 0 A textualist would
readily infer that these rights should be available in every criminal
prosecution-that, in other words, the phrase "all criminal prosecutions"
means precisely what it says. This inference would be all the more
compelling given that Article III unequivocally mandates the use of juries in
all federal criminal trials." Undaunted by text, however, the Supreme Court
has charted another course.
In Duncan v. Louisiana,2 the Warren Court sugar-coated the bitter pill
of incorporation of the jury-trial provision against the states by concluding
that states need not provide juries in prosecutions for "petty" crimes.' 3 The
supposedly more textually oriented Rehnquist Court magnified this error by
extending it to federal prosecutions, in which the universality of juries in
criminal cases is even more clearly established by the text of Article llI.14 In
neither instance did the Court even try to reconcile its categorical exclusion
of petty crimes from the scope of the right to trial by jury with the
constitutional text. The Court's "ventriloquist's dummy" thus was made to
speak in a manner contrary to the plain text of the Constitution.'5 This
approach-taking liberties with the Constitution in the name of what struck
the Justices as good policy-has been characteristic of many criminal
procedure rulings, particularly during the Warren Court's "Rights
Revolution."' 6
10. See U.S. CONST. amend VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury... 2).
11. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, § 2, cL 3 ('The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury...."). Seen in this light, juries are not merely a matter of a defendant's "right"; they
are also a structural check against arbitrary exercises of power by trial judges. See generally AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BIL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 83-88 (1998).
12. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
13. Id. at 159. "Petty crimes" are generally defined as crimes for which six months or less
imprisonment is authorized. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538.542-43 (1989).
14. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996) (holding that no right to jury trial exists in
federal prosecutions for petty crimes despite U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (quoted supra note 11)).
Lewis, in fact, went considerably beyond Duncan in limiting the right to trial by jury. Levis held
that prosecutors can avoid jury trials simply by "stacking" against the defendant multiple crimes
that, if charged separately, would be considered petty offenses but in combination carry the
possibility of consecutive jail sentences in excess of the six-month threshold for serious crimes. Id.
at 330. Justice Anthony Kennedy, though concurring on other grounds, described the "no
aggregation" rule endorsed in Levis as "one of the most serious incursions on the right to jury trial
in the Court's history." Id. at 331 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15. For all the talk about "indeterminacy" in constitutional law, there is broad consensus among
constitutional theorists that constitutional text is binding on judges. See generally GEOFFREY R.
STONE Er AL., CoNsTmTmoNAL LAw 691-92 (1986). Against this backdrop, Duncan and Lewis
show just how far removed criminal procedure often is from conventional constitutional interpretation.
16. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 2, at 1125 ('On a lawycrly level, some of the Warren Court's most
important criminal procedure pronouncements lacked firm grounding in constitutional text and
structure."); Stuntz, supra note 6, at 11 (noting that the Warren Court produced "a great many
constitutional rules, most of which are highly contestable").
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In the case of the Warren Court, however, it was not to last for very
long. Richard M. Nixon relentlessly attacked the Court's criminal procedure
decisions during his 1968 campaign for president and pledged to appoint
Justices who would not "handcuff' the police. 17 Nixon was swept into the
White House, and he and his Republican successors named the next eleven
Justices to the Supreme Court, including Warren E. Burger (to replace
Warren) and William H. Rehnquist (to replace Burger) as Chief Justices in
1969 and 1986 respectively.' 8 Over the next three decades, the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts fundamentally reworked constitutional criminal procedure
through a gradual yet highly effective process of limiting and chipping away
at, and occasionally overruling, Warren-era precedents.
The alarm went out from the academy: "[M]any commentators-usually
admirers of the Warren Court's handiwork-have lamented over the years
about what they view as a wholesale repudiation of the Warren Court's work;
their comments are full of words like 'retreat,' 'decline,' and 'counter-
revolution.""19  Critics of the "Counterrevolution" assailed the Court for
"judicial activism,"20 a charge that once formed the rallying cry of Warren's
critics. More interestingly, even supporters of the Rehnquist Court began to
accept the "activist" label-yes, the Court was activist, but it was doing the
right thing.21 All of this makes criminal procedure an interesting context in
which to address conservative judicial activism.
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. In Part II, I use
the example of habeas corpus to illustrate how key Warren Court decisions in
17. See Steiker, supra note 4, at 2466. The Democratic candidate for president, Hubert
Humphrey, refused to defend the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions against Nixon's attacks.
See George C. Thomas, The End of the Road for Miranda v. Arizona?: On the History and Future of
Rules for Police Interrogation, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 11 (2000).
18. There were, of course, some occasional miscues; Justices Harry A. Blackmun, John Paul
Stevens, and David H. Souter became reliably liberal voices on the Court. Even so, the unprecedented
string of appointments by Republican presidents successfully shifted the balance of power in favor of
the conservative wing of the Court in criminal procedure.
19. Steiker, supra note 4, at 2467. Of course, those who were hoping for mass overrulings of
Warren Court precedents would soon find those hopes dashed. See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, The Paths
Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REv. 898 (2001); Joseph D.
Grano, Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: The
Contribution of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy, 22 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 395, 400
(1989).
20. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Court & Justice: An Oxymoron?, 1 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 37, 37 (1999); Jennelle London Joset, May It Please the Constitution: Judicial Activism
and Its Effect on Criminal Procedure, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 1021 (1996); Christopher E. Smith & Avis
Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Court's Activism and the Risk ofInjustice, 26 CoNN. L. REV, 53, 59-
66 (1993).
21. See, e.g., Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820, 892-93 (4th Cir.
1999) (en banc) (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring), affd sub non. United States v. Morison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court's "New Federalism" decisions are an exercise in 'Judicial
activism" but a "constructive one"); cf generally Earl M. Maltz, The Prospects for a Revival of
Conservative Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 629, 631 (1990) (predicting "a
more aggressive conservative activism in the future").
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criminal procedure fared during the Counterrevolution waged by the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts.22 In Parts Im and IV, I turn to a normative analysis of
the conservative Court's reworking of constitutional criminal procedure.
After dealing in Part II with the superficially easy, but on reflection quite
difficult, issue of defining judicial activism, I advance a limited defense of
judicial activism in Part IV. My basic claim is that even if the
Counterrevolution is viewed as activist-as I think much of it must be-it
nevertheless was normatively defensible as a necessary condition, in a
"second-best" world, of reaching an equilibrium closer to the judicial
restraint model than would be possible if activism were only a one-way
ratchet.
Though my thesis supplies a justification for the Burger and Rehnquist
Court's basic approach to legal change, it would be a mistake to conclude
that my argument is simply that activism is an acceptable course for
conservative Justices. To me, "reactivism"--activism in response to, and in
amelioration of, earlier activism-would be equally justified as a response by
liberal Justices to conservative activism. Even though reactivism can be used
to move the law back in the direction it would have taken had the first
episode of activism been characterized instead by restraint, reactivism is not
necessarily a conservative construct.
Properly understood, "restraint" may be either liberal or conservative
depending on the type of policies the political branches are pursuing at any
given time. During the New Deal, for example, judicial restraint would have
favored politically liberal ends (such as the growth of the modem welfare
state) because that was the orientation of reform-minded national and state
legislatures at the time. By contrast, where the political branches are
pursuing conservative initiatives, as was generally the case during the last
two decades (think of limiting welfare and habeas corpus and bringing back
the federal death penalty as examples), judicial restraint would favor
politically conservative ends. Consequently, even though Republican
presidents from the time of Nixon forward have understandably used
restraint as a kind of code-word for a conservative judicial philosophy, there
is no inherent political bias in the concept of judicial restraint or of
reactivism. The Counterrevolution in criminal procedure brings these points
sharply into focus. The Supreme Court over the last few decades has
unquestionably been conservative on criminal procedure matters. At the
same time, it has been quite activist.
22. To avoid potential confusion, I should note that I follow the usual convention of using the
unmodified term "habeas corpus" to refer to the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum--the vehicle
by which the legality of detention is tested. At common law, there were other forms of habeas corpus
that served other purposes not relevant here. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. Er AL, HART AND
WE HSLER'S THE FEDERAL Coutrs AND THE FEDERAL SYSMI 1337 n.1 (4th ed. 1996) (describing
the various forms of the writ of habeas corpus enumerated by Blackstone).
20021 1061
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II. Habeas Corpus from Warren to Rehnquist
A detailed survey of the key elements of the Warren Court's criminal
procedure decisions and how they held up during the Rehnquist Court is
beyond the scope of this Article.23 What I propose to do instead is to use
habeas corpus-the historic vehicle for obtaining federal-court review of
constitutional challenges to state-court convictions-as a case study in how
the Burger and Rehnquist Courts responded to Warren Court criminal
procedure precedents they believed to be erroneous. It might seem odd to
start with habeas corpus, which is at least superficially a statutory remedy, as
a case study in constitutional criminal procedure, so I should defend my
approach briefly before turning to habeas.
At the outset, it would be a mistake to dismiss habeas corpus
jurisprudence as merely an implementation of legislative policy choices.
Habeas relief, in point of fact, is not a statutory remedy at all, if by
"statutory" one means that the statute itself, as opposed to court decisions, is
the source of the applicable rules of decision.24 Historically, the Supreme
Court, not Congress, has created the myriad rules and limitations governing
the availability of habeas corpus. Until recently, the main hard-and-fast rule
on the issue that originated with Congress was that habeas relief could not be
granted on the basis of violations of state law.25 Other than this limitation,
the only guidance Congress traditionally gave the courts was that they should
exercise their habeas jurisdiction "as law and justice require.' 2 6
23. For such a detailed survey dealing with the criminal-investigation side of constitutional
criminal procedure, see Steiker, supra note 4, at 2466-532. Professor Steiker's basic insight is that the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts fundamentally reworked criminal procedure without mass overlings.
In her words:
The proponents and debunkers of the "counter-revolution" hypothesis turn out to both
be right: the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have accepted to a significant extent the
Warren Court's definition of constitutional "rights" while waging counter-
revolutionary war against the Warren Court's constitutional "remedies" of evidentiary
exclusion and its federal review and reversal of convictions.
l at 2470.
24. At its inception in England, habeas corpus was one of the great common-law writs. By the
mid-fourteenth century, it had developed into an important but limited vehicle for challenging
detention by the Crown that was contrary to the "law of the land" and that was achieved without what
would later become known as "due process of law." See generally WILLAM F. DUKER, A
CONsTrrIToNAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUs 2327 (1980) (discussing the expansion of the writ of
habeas corpus in the mid-fourteenth century). It has been settled from the early years of the Republic
that the power to issue writs of habeas corpus, though referenced in the Constitution, see U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2, exists in the federal courts only where authorized by Congress. See Exparte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93-94 (1807) (treating as a preliminary question "whether by any statute,
compatible with the Constitution of the United States, the power to award a writ of habeas corpus,...
has been given to this Court). Even so, in cases where habeas relief has been legislatively authorized,
the substantive law of habeas corpus could be determined by reference to common-law principles. Id.
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994) (providing that the writ can issue "only on the ground that [the
prisoner] ... is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States").
26. lId § 2243. The one critically important exception to this historical trend is the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), tit. I, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214
1062
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As a result, it was the Court that, in the first instance, traditionally
created rules governing when the writ of habeas corpus could issue, with
Congress occasionally codifying certain court-developed rules by statute. An
illustration is the familiar rule that a habeas petitioner must generally exhaust
available state-court remedies before proceeding in federal court: the Court
created the exhaustion requirement and Congress later codified it. 7 The fact
that habeas corpus rules traditionally have been judicially created is
significant for present purposes because it undermines any suggestion that
developments in habeas corpus are not representative of court-driven
elements of constitutional criminal procedure. It would be odd indeed if
habeas corpus-the remedy for constitutional violations-were to have
evolved independently of the evolution of the underlying constitutional rights
enforced through habeas given the necessary logical connection betveen
rights and remedies in law.2 Habeas corpus, therefore, is properly viewed as
a part-indeed, a critical part-of constitutional criminal procedure.
The importance of habeas corpus in constitutional criminal procedure is
shown by the fact, made evident below, that both the Warren Court and the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts addressed themselves early on to habeas corpus
reform. For the Warren Court, all of the constitutional rights in the world
would count for little unless state-court prisoners (and particularly the black
ones, who were especially poorly treated in Southern courts) could get out of
state court and seek redress in federal court-specifically, in the lower
federal courts.30  Habeas corpus was also of central importance in the
Counterrevolution. Slowing the growth in the rights of criminal defendants,
or even cutting back the scope of such rights, could not effectively swing the
pendulum back in the direction of law enforcement if death-row inmates
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), in which a bipartisan Congress, acting in the wake of the
Oklahoma City bombing, went far beyond even the Rehnquist Court in restricting the scope of habeas
corpus. Among other things, the AEDPA adopts a strict time limit for filing habeas proceedings, see
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (Supp. V 1999), a "reasonableness" standard requiring deference to state courts'
resolution of federal constitutional issues, see id § 2254(d)(1) (Supp. V 1999), and restrictive standards
governing relitigation in successive habeas cases, see iL § 2244(b) (Supp. V 1999).
27. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (Supp. V 1999) (codifying exhaustion requirement of Er parte
Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-17 (1944), as a prerequisite to issuance of the writ); see generally DtJKEq
supra note 24, at 203-04 (detailing the development of the habeas exhaustion doctrine).
28. For a probing exploration of the linkage between rights and remedies, see Daryl J. Levinson,
Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 CoLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999).
29. For a similar view, see Joseph L. Hoffman & William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution,
1993 Sup. Cr. REv. 65, 68.
30. State prisoners could seek certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States on direct review
of their convictions, but docket constraints rendered the Court institutionally incapable of effectively
policing state criminal trials without assistance from the lower federal courts. The advantage of habeas
corpus proceedings as a vehicle for policing state trials is that they are filed in U.S. District Court and
are followed by appeals of right to the regional courts of appeals and the possibility of certiorari in the
Supreme Court. As such, habeas corpus allows the lower federal courts to perform the review
functions that docket constraints prevent the Supreme Court from performing on certiorari directly
from the state-court systems.
106320021
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could avoid execution with protracted habeas proceedings or if prisoners
serving long sentences could file repeated habeas proceedings years after
their convictions to take advantage of intervening changes in constitutional
law. For both Courts, therefore, habeas corpus reform was integral to the
successful implementation of their very different constitutional visions of
criminal justice and of federal-state court relations in the administration of
the criminal law.
There is another reason for viewing habeas as indicative of
developments in other areas of constitutional criminal procedure. In a real
sense, the various arguments over the merits of individual criminal procedure
decisions were all reflected in, and swamped by, the larger debate over the
scope and purposes of federal habeas corpus. In other words, the habeas
debate-namely, whether federal habeas relief should serve a broad or more
limited role in policing the administration of justice in state criminal
courts31-also factored into the debate that took place when it came, for
example, to police interrogation in Miranda v. Arizona32 or the exclusionary
rule in Mapp v. Ohio.33 In each instance, the basic issue for the Supreme
Court was whether institutions of state government could be trusted to define
and remedy federal constitutional violations and to ensure fair treatment of
criminal defendants in general and especially racial minorities. If not-and,
at every turn, the Warren Court found states untrustworthy-then expansive
federal judicial oversight would be imposed so that federal courts could
perform the constitutional review that states could not be trusted to perform.
For these reasons, habeas corpus is a fitting candidate for a case study in the
Revolution/Counterrevolution dialectic in constitutional criminal procedure.
Turning, then, to habeas corpus, the basic lesson is that there, as
elsewhere in constitutional criminal procedure, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts did indeed work a counterrevolution in the doctrinal rules they
inherited from the Warren Court. To be sure, the scope of habeas corpus
remains broader than it was before the time of the Warren Court, just as
criminal procedure as a whole remains almost entirely constitutionalized. In
31. The habeas debate has consisted of clashes between what has been described as "Federalist"
and "Nationalise' ideologies. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts
Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141, 1151-63 (1988). In criminal procedure, the Federalists emphasize the
fairness, competence, and integrity of state courts as enforcers of federal constitutional rights and
therefore advocate giving deference and substantial measures of finality to state courts decisions.
Nationalists, however, believe that the state courts are decidedly inferior to federal courts in the
enforcement of federal constitutional norms and advocate aggressive review of .tate court criminal
convictions. See Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 29, at 70-71. As will become evident below,
Nationalism drove the Warren Court's jurisprudence, and Federalism was the guiding principle for the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts.
32. 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 (1966) (requiring administration of the now-famous "Miranda
warnings" as a prerequisite for the admissibility of confessions made by suspects in police custody).
33. 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (requiring state courts to exclude at trial evidence seized in violation
of the Fourth Amendment).
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both respects, the triumph of the Warren Court has been an enduring one.
Still, the victory is far less complete-and, some might say, far less
meaningful-after three decades of Counterrevolution. In the case of habeas
corpus, the doors to the federal courthouse, though still open, are only barely
so: the vast majority of habeas petitions are essentially doomed to failure
before they even reach the federal courthouse. As with habeas, constitutional
criminal procedure as a whole looks very different today than it did forty
years ago.
A. The Warren Court Revolution
The American writ of habeas corpus, made available for the first time in
1867 to prisoners challenging the constitutionality of state-court
convictions, 4 was originally quite limited in scope. The writ was available
only to correct the small category of constitutional infirmities that were
regarded as in some sense "jurisdictional" in nature.3 5  Unless the claimed
error of federal law deprived the state court of jurisdiction, the judgment of
conviction would preclude a collateral attack in a federal habeas
proceeding.
36
34. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82, first authorized the fcderal courts to
issue writs of habeas corpus to correct unlawful deprivations of liberty, but that authorization was
limited to federal prisoners. See Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75,99 (1807) (construing § 14 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 as authorizing habeas corpus for federal prisoners only). Two later pieces of
legislation, enacted in response to two famous incidents in the mid-nineteenth century, authorized
federal courts to order the release of prisoners held under state law where the prisoners we foreign
nationals held for acts ordered by foreign governments or U.S. citizens held for actions authorized by
federal law. See DUKER, supra note 24, at 187-89 (discussing laws passed in 1833 and 1842). These
comparatively insignificant expansions of habeas corpus into the state-prisoner realm, which were
motivated by a desire to protect federal supremacy in specific areas of unique federal concern (such as
foreign relations) as opposed to generalized suspicion or distrust of state courts, were overshadowed in
importance by the 1867 legislation. The 1867 law extended habeas corpus to "all cases where any
person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of
the United States." ActofFeb.5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
35. See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 478-99 (1963) (surveying the development of habeas corpus in
America).
36. See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830) ("An imprisonment under a
judgment cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the
court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should be erroneous:). Tre, the Court had
applied the jurisdiction limitation somewhat elastically-a good example is Frank v. Magnum, 237
U.S. 309 (1915), in which the Court held that the fact that a trial was conducted in a lynch-mob
atmosphere implicated the trial court's jurisdiction. Oddly enough, after overcoming the jurisdictional
limitation, the Frank Court then proceeded to deny the habeas petition on the merits, based on the state
appellate court's determination that the atmosphere in which the trial was conducted had no effect on
the outcome. Id. at 334-38. Despite the elasticity of the Court's conception of "jurisdiction,"
however, the relevant point is that the Court had traditionally made "some effort, no matter how
implausible, to 'kiss the jurisdictional book."' Barry Friedman, A Tale of Two Habeas, 73 M LN,. 
REv. 247, 263 (1988). The only apparent exception is Maley r. Jolnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942) (per
curiam), in which the Court seems to have held that it was unnecessary to "kiss the jurisdictional book"
if the habeas petitioner's claims could not have been raised in state court. Waley, howevez, did not
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One of the first major undertakings by the Warren Court was to broaden
access for state-court prisoners to challenge their convictions in federal court.
That this project would be an integral part of the Court's reform agenda made
perfect sense. Episodes like the unconscionable, racist ordeal of the
Scottsboro Boys in the Alabama courts made it painfully obvious that
Southern courts could not be trusted to try black defendants accused of
serious crimes against whites in anything resembling a fair and evenhanded
manner.37 Consequently, the Warren Court sought to transform the "Great
Writ" into an effective vehicle for policing the actions of state law
enforcement, prosecutors, and judges. 38
Just two years after firing the opening shot in the Revolution in 1961, "a
the Court took up the issue of habeas corpus. First, a little background is
necessary. In Brown v. Allen,40 decided a few months before Warren became
Chief Justice, the Court had taken the important step of lifting the
"jurisdiction" limitation on habeas corpus, albeit, curiously, without
erode the jurisdiction limitation where claims were raised or could have been raised in state court. See
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ErTAL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.3(c), at 1306 (3d ed. 2000).
37. The Scottsboro Boys were nine black youths charged in Alabama with raping two white
women alleged to have been prostitutes. Even though the evidence against the defendants was weak-
for example, the medical evidence suggested that neither woman had been raped and the women's
testimony conflicted in important ways-the all-white jury convicted the defendants and sentenced all
but one of them to death (including one who was too young to be sentenced to death under Alabama
law). It was fairly clear at the time, and is now widely accepted as true, that the defendants were
almost certainly innocent. Indeed, at a retrial, one of the two alleged rape victims recanted and testified
that they had fabricated the allegations of rape, and many newspapers (both in the North and the South)
ran articles in the early 1930s contending that the Scottsboro Boys had, in all likelihood, been wrongly
convicted. See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MictI. L,
REv. 48, 64-67 (2000).
38. It is no coincidence that the Warren Court also breathed new life into another previously
moribund, Reconstruction-era federal remedy for unconstitutional state action, 12 U.S.C. § 1983,
which even today still constitutes the basic vehicle for challenging the constitutionality of state action
in federal court. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1963). The culprits, in the Court's view, were not
just local police and prosecutors, but also state judges, who, either due to lack of integrity or
independence, could not be trusted faithfully to enforce federal rights, and so an array of broad federal
remedies allowing federal judges to enforce those rights directly was the cure. Damages actions under
§ 1983 would be a vehicle for policing the police in addition to the exclusionary rule whereas habeas
corpus would be the means of regulating misconduct by prosecutors and judges.
39. Many commentators identify Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), as the point at which the
Revolution began. JEROLD H. ISRAEL Er AL., CRIMNAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION 285
(2000). Professor Israel and his coauthors, however, believe that it may be appropriate to trace the
Revolution back to Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), where a badly splintered Court held that
states must furnish trial transcripts for indigents appealing criminal convictions if such transcripts are a
legal prerequisite to an appeal. Mapp seems the better choice between the two, both in terms of its
temporal proximity to the rest of the Revolution and its intrinsic importance. Griffin, after all, was
comparatively insignificant, measured against the obvious importance of Mapp, until it was extended
to the right to appellate counsel in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), in sweeping terms that
seemed to invalidate all wealth-based inequalities in the criminal justice system. Even so, Professor
Israel and his coauthors are surely correct that Griffin was the first real indication of the Warren
Court's creativity in criminal procedure and willingness to tackle endemic problems in the criminal
justice system, such as indigency and racism.
40. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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acknowledging what it was doing.41 Brown had opened the path to federal-
court supervision of state criminal investigation and adjudication, but a
serious practical obstacle prevented habeas from realizing its full potential as
an effective tool for policing the states. It was to this obstacle that the
Warren Court turned its attention.
For a variety of reasons in contested criminal cases, perhaps most often
lawyer incompetence, viable federal claims are often not raised, and
therefore are not adjudicated, in the state courts. This problem is of even
greater importance in a system characterized by plea bargaining; by pleading
guilty, as the vast majority of defendants do in the United States,42 a
defendant almost invariably foregoes the opportunity to challenge his
conviction on direct appeal.4 3 Would such "procedurally defaulted" claims-
that is, federal claims not properly preserved in state court-be cognizable on
habeas? Prior law said no; the Warren Court reversed course in 1963 in Fay
v. Noia.4
In Fay, the Court held that procedurally defaulted claims could be
adjudicated in the first instance by a federal court sitting in habeas as long as
the defendant himself, as opposed to his lawyer, had not consciously decided
to "deliberate[ly] bypassl]" available state remedies.45 The deliberate-bypass
standard left little room for procedural defaults because, under certain
41. See generally Friedman, supra note 36. at 264--65 ("The fact that the Brown Court did address
Brown's claims on the merits, without any attempt to fit them into the jurisdictional framework.
signalled a shift in the scope of the writ. Brown has been cited frequently for the proposition that
habeas lies to correct any constitutional error addressed in state-court proceedings. This represented a
shift of tremendous significance, yet the Brown Court not only failed to explain the shift but failed
even to acknowledge it." (footnote omitted)). For a contrary argument that Brown was not as legally
significant as the conventional wisdom posits, see Eric M. Freedman, Brown v. Allea: The Habeas
Corpus Revolution That Wasn't, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1541 (2000).
42. Recent statistics show that more than 90% of state-court felony convictions nationwide are the
result of a guilty plea, as opposed to conviction following a trial. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICs-1995, at 498 bl.5.47
(1996). Though unknown for much of the history of the common law, the roots of systemic plea
bargaining trace back well into the nineteenth century and certainly were deeply implanted in
American practice by the time of the Warren Court. See generally John H. Langbein, Understanding
the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 261,261-70 (1979) (discussing various
factors that led to significant plea bargaining in nineteenth-century common-law jurisdictions). An
important recent treatment of the origins of plea bargaining notes that, by the 1920s, scholars were
already "lament[ing] our 'vanishing jury,"' a reference to the widespread use of plea bargaining as a
substitute for criminal trials. George Fisher, Plea Bargaining's Trionph, 109 YALE LJ. 857, 859
(2000).
43. It is theoretically possible but exceedingly rare for a defendant who has unconditionally pled
guilty to file a direct appeal challenging the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence. This makes
sense because a defense lawyer who advises entry of an unconditional guilty plea presumably does so
in the belief that the sentence reduction or other concession offered in exchange for the guilty plea is
advantageous for the defendant It is only later, after the time for a direct appeal has expired, that a
defendant usually has second thoughts about having pled guilty, by which time he will typically have
forfeited his right to appellate review.
44. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
45. Id at 439.
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circumstances, even a conscious decision by a defendant not to raise a federal
claim might not bar habeas review. 46 Even where a deliberate bypass had
occurred, moreover, a federal court had the discretion to reach the merits of
the defaulted claim.
47
That same year, in Townsend v. Sain,48 the Warren Court returned to
Brown v. Allen and the issue of claims that were properly preserved in state
court. Brown had concluded that federal district courts were required to
afford habeas petitioners evidentiary hearings to establish facts necessary to
their constitutional claims only where there was a "vital flaw" in the state
court's factfinding.49 In Townsend, the Court rejected that standard as too
restrictive, holding that district courts "must grant an evidentiary hearing" to
resolve disputed issues of fact if the petitioner had not deliberately bypassed
opportunities to develop the necessary factual record in the state courts.
50
With these decisions, the path to full, de novo relitigation in the lower
federal courts and ultimately on certiorari in the Supreme Court was assured
for state-court prisoners. It is difficult to underestimate the considerable
doctrinal creativity on the part of the Warren Court that ushered in the
modem era of habeas corpus. Prior to the Warren Court, habeas corpus was
an extraordinary remedy that permitted federal court intervention only when
a state court proceeding was so fundamentally flawed as to render the
resulting conviction an "absolute nullity."51 The Warren Court was the first
in history explicitly to reject that limited conception of habeas, advancing a
broad remedial vision for habeas in which the federal courts would serve as
the ultimate guardian of the rights of criminal defendants not just in the
extraordinary case, but in every case where the habeas jurisdiction was
invoked. Along with the bold new mission for habeas corpus, came a new
perception of the state courts: state courts were either unwilling to enforce, or
institutionally incapable of enforcing, federal constitutional rights in a fair
and impartial manner, particularly in cases involving minority defendants.
These developments not only changed habeas corpus, but also revolutionized
the administration of the criminal law in America.
Having thus transformed habeas corpus into a potent federal remedy for
state-court prisoners, the Warren Court spent the balance of the Revolution
federalizing the "substance," as it were, of criminal procedure. The result
was a staggering array of new, judge-made constitutional mandates based on
46. In Fay, the defendant elected not to appeal to a higher state court in order to avoid the risk that
if his life sentence were overturned, he would face the possibility of a death sentence; the Court ruled
that no deliberate bypass had occurred. l at 439-40.
47. Id. at 438.
48. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
49. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,506 (1953).
50. Idl at 312-13 (emphasis added).
51. Exparte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193,203 (1830).
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the Bill of Rights and made applicable to the states, governing permissible
practices in all areas of criminal procedure, including search and seizure,52
police interrogation,53 and criminal adjudication.Y
Prior decisions on these, and other, scores were overruled.55 In fact, so
many decisions were overruled that, as one commentator wryly put it, "[t]he
list of opinions destroyed by the Warren Court reads like a table of contents
from an old constitutional law casebook. ' 56 From then on, state courts would
have to do it Warren's way if they wanted their convictions to stand up in
federal court. It is easy to see why the Warren Court's jurisprudence was
regarded as nothing short of revolutionary.
B. The Counterrevolution That Was (And Is)f7
By 1969 the Warren Court had come to an end, and the
Counterrevolution had begun. Some might say the Counterrevolution did not
really begin until the mid-1980s, when "law-and-order" conservative Justices
finally had a reliable majority on the Court.58  To be sure, most of the
dramatic roll-backs would have to await Ronald Reagan's appointments to
52. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (expanding the Fourth Amendment to
reach far beyond the confines of real-property law in order to protect broader "privacy" interests);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the states).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (extending the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel to post-indictment suspect line-ups); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US. 436 (1966) (ruling that
suspect confessions made while in police custody must be excluded from evidence unless preceded by
the now-famous Miranda warnings); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (holding that
police cannot deliberately elicit incriminating statements from a defendant, in the absence of his
attorney, once formal adversary proceedings have been initiated).
54. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (ruling that defendants charged with
felonies and other serious crimes have the right to trial by jury); Douglas v. California, 372 US. 353
(1963) (ruling that indigent convicts have the right to appointed counsel, at the state's expense, in first
appeals of right); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that indigent defendants have a
right to state-funded defense counsel in all felony prosecutions).
55. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (overruling Olmstead v. United States, 277 US. 438 (1928)):
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342-45 (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654-
56 (ovemiling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)).
56. PHuiPB. KURLAND, POLITCS, THE CONMThrtON, AND THE WARREN COURT 90-91 (1970).
57. My heading comes from the clever title of an interesting collection of essays published by my
colleague, Vince Blasi. THE BURGER COURT. THE COUNTER-REvOLUmoN THAT WASN'T (Vincent
Blasi ed., 1983). By inverting his title, I do not mean to suggest disagreement with his basic premis.-
namely, that the Burger years exhibited only a "moderating influence" on the continued expansion of
Warren-era doctrine and thus dashed hopes or fears of'"reversals and undercuttings of activist Warren
Court precedents." Vincent Blasi, The Rootless Activism of the Burger Court, in THEBURGER COURT:.
THE CouNTER-REvoLuTON THAT WASN'T, supra, at 199. In many ways, the Burger years were
transitional ones, and, with the exception of habeas corpus law, it was not until the rise of the
Rehnquist Court that the criminal-procedure world began to look very different. A broader roll-back in
criminal procedure was difficult during the Burger years given the fact that Justice Stewart who had
dissented in cases like Miranda and Escobedo and therefore would have been a likely pick to vote to
overrule such cases, had a secret policy of refusing to join Nixon-appointed Justices in overturning
Warren Court precedents. See Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on
Multinember Courts, 97 MIcH. L. REv. 2297,2322 n.76 (1999).
58. Cf., e.g., Blasi, supra note 57, at 198.
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the Court, and, in the meantime, significant expansions of key Warren Court
precedents occurred on Burger's watch.59 On the whole, however, the
Burger years were more than just the calm before the storm-many Warren
Court precedents were curtailed or at least not significantly extended, and the
Court's application of Warren-era precedents began to take on a distinctly
more prosecution-friendly flavor.
60
Even the Burger Court, with the conservatives' more tenuous hold on
power, was able to begin an affirmative roll-back when it came to habeas
corpus. Interestingly enough, habeas corpus drew the Burger Court's
attention fairly early on, as it had during the Warren years, It is
understandable that limiting habeas would have been a top priority during the
Counterrevolution.
Both the rhetoric and substance of the expansion of habeas by the
Warren Court had the effect of treating state judges as second-class citizens.
Instead of being equal partners in the enforcement of federal constitutional
norms and in the administration of justice, state judges were treated as part of
the problem. They were viewed as either less competent than their federal
counterparts or less committed to full and fair enforcement of federal law
than federal judges, and their processes were accordingly given less respect
than federal processes and their convictions less finality than federal
convictions.
61
In addition, absent the sort of statutory limits on habeas corpus added by
Congress in 1996,62 habeas corpus litigation had developed into a serious
threat to the finality of state-court criminal convictions. It was not
uncommon for state prisoners to make multiple trips through federal habeas,
which was possible until the 1996 Act because a denial of habeas relief
59. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (refusing to overrule Miranda and
expanding Massiah beyond explicit interrogation to reach police statements, such as the legendary
"Christian burial" speech, that facilitate incriminating answers from a suspect). As Professor Steiker
explains, Breiver was both "dramatic[] and emphaticO" in its reaffirmation of Massiah. Steiker, supra
note 4, at 2475.
60. For example, the Burger Court ruled that evidence seized in violation of Miranda can
nonetheless be used to impeach testimony by the defendant at trial, see Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222 (1971), and that Miranda does not apply in evaluating the voluntariness of a consent to search by
someone not in custody, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Later, with only Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor replacing Justice Potter Stewart (who was often on the conservative side of
criminal procedure issues), the Burger Court held that the fruits of unreasonable searches and seizures
are admissible notwithstanding Mapp where the officers acted in good-faith reliance on a defective
warrant, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and that statements obtained in violation of
Massiah (and, by extension, Miranda and the Fourth Amendment) could be used at trial if the police
would have inevitably discovered the incriminating evidence, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431
(1984). It was also the Burger Court that first recast the Miranda warnings as "prophylactic" standards
rather than real constitutional mandates. See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 439 (1974). This
aspect of Tucker was ultimately disavowed in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437-40
(2000), with the Dickerson Court ruling that "Miranda is a constitutional decision."
61. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REv. 593,597 (1991).
62. See supra note 25 (citing the AEDPA).
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historically did not preclude later habeas actions.63  For each trip through
habeas, states were forced to expend time and resources defending
convictions years (and occasionally decades) after criminal trials had taken
place.64 Therefore, once the balance of power shifted on the Court, it was
only a matter of time before the Court would revisit the subject of habeas
corpus.
The Burger Court's first target was the deliberate-bypass standard for
procedural defaults under Fay v. Noia.6 In Davis v. United States,6 the
Court formulated an alternative standard for determining whether failure to
object to racial discrimination in the selection of a federal grand jury
amounted to a procedural default.67 In place of the deliberate-bypass
standard, the Court enunciated what would come to be known as the "cause-
and-prejudice" standard: failure properly to preserve a claim at trial in a
federal prosecution or on direct appeal would preclude postconviction review
on the defaulted claim unless the prisoner could show "cause" for the default
and that he suffered "actual prejudice" from the constitutional violation. s
On its face, the holding in Davis is reconcilable with Fay, if only
because Davis arose under the postconviction procedure for federal
prisoners, not the separate habeas corpus procedure for state prisoners.69 The
difference in reasoning, however, is stark. Whereas Fay pointed to forfeiture
of state-court remedies as a sufficient punishment for (and deterrent to)
procedural defaults, 70 Davis pointed to the forfeiture of similar remedies in a
federal prosecution as reason to bar postconviction remedies as well.7 '
Especially to a conservative Court that prided itself for taking
federalism seriously, the striking asymmetry created by the interaction of
Davis and Fay, in which courts protected the integrity of federal (but not
63. See generally LAFAVE ET AL, supra note 36, § 28.5(c), at 1330-31. For its part, the Warren
Court had held that relitigation in a subsequent habeas proceeding was not barred unless "the ends of
justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application:' Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 15 (1963).
64. See, eg., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (reversing a twenty-three-year-old murder
conviction due to the exclusion of blacks from the grand jury by the trial judge). As one would
expect, the relitigation problem was particularly serious in capital cases. Bluntly put, for prisoners
seeking to avoid execution, delay itself in many cases is a victory, albeit surely not the full victory
they would want. Indeed, with the Court's move to the right on criminal procedure issues from the
Nixon years forward, delay was increasingly the only victory many death-row inmates could
realistically expect from the Supreme Court.
65. 372U.S. 391 (1963).
66. 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
67. Id at 242-44.
68. Id. at244-45.
69. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2001) (regarding collateral review of federal convictions) with id.
§ 2254 (regarding habeas corpus proceedings).
70. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 433.
71. See Davis, 411 U.S. at 242.
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state) procedures, would not be tolerable.72 Sure enough, the Court later
confronted this imbalance. In Wainwright v. Sykes, 73 the Court extended
Davis's cause-and-prejudice standard to virtually all procedural defaults in
state court, thereby ensuring parity of treatment as between federal and state
courts in the vast majority of cases.74
Dismissing the "sweeping language" of Fay as "dicta,"'75 Justice
Rehnquist's majority opinion in Sykes ruled that state court raise-or-waive
rules deserve "greater respect" than they received under the approach taken
in Fay, which the Court limited to its facts.76 In dissent, Justice Brennan
condemned as "unfair" any procedural default rule that would "visit[] the
mistakes of a trial attorney on the head of a habeas corpus applicant" and
thus argued for retention of the deliberate-bypass standard.77 In Coleman v.
Thompson,78 the Court drained the little vitality that remained in the
deliberate-bypass standard after Sykes, holding that, short of a "fundamental
miscarriage of justice," "all cases" of procedural defaults are governed by the
cause-and-prejudice standard.79
72. Federalism is usually thought of as an imperative of the Rehnquist Court rather than the
Burger Court, but it would be a mistake to dismiss the Burger Court as a Court that had little regard
for federalism. Even beyond the restrictive habeas cases discussed in the text and the Court's paean
to "Our Federalism" in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), in which the Court made it virtually
impossible for federal courts to enjoin criminal prosecutions pending in state court, the Burger
Court's basic commitment to federalism is evident. That commitment is more easily overlooked
than the Rehnquist Court's because the Burger Court's efforts to promote state sovereignty were
largely limited to matters of federal jurisdiction. With the principal exception of National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)-which the Burger Court itself later overruled, see Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)-the Burger Court's federalism decisions
were aimed not at limiting the lawmaking powers of Congress, but rather the power of the federal
judiciary over the states. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89
(1984) (sovereign immunity); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (prospective relief
against state actors); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (busing); Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651 (1974) (sovereign immunity). For an overview of the Burger Court's record on federalism
issues, see Lea Brilmayer & Ronald D. Lee, State Sovereignty and the Two Faces of Federalism: A
Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the Conflict of Laws, 60 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 833
(1985).
73. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
74. Id. at 87-88. The Court did not define "cause"' and "prejudice" except to say that they are
"narrower than the standard set forth in dicta in Fay." Id. at 88. The Court later held that attorney
error will constitute "cause" sufficient to excuse a procedural default only where attributable to a
conflict of interest or so egregious as to constitute an independent Sixth Amendment violation under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986).
Outside of these contexts, the Court found "no inequity in requiring [a habeas petitioner] to bear the
risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default.' Id.
75. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 85.
76. See id at 87-88 ("It is the sweeping language of Fay v. Noia, going far beyond the facts of the
case eliciting it, which we today reject").
77. Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
79. l at 750-51 (emphasis added). The addition of "fundamental miscarriage of justice" as
another basis for excusing procedural defaults was designed primarily as a safety valve for any
factually innocent defendants who were nonetheless convicted. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. The
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The Court's next major effort was to tighten up the standards for
securing relief on claims that were properly preserved in state court. In Stone
v. Powell,80 the Court, emphasizing the "costs" and "benefits" of habeas
review, held that Fourth Amendment exclusionary-rule claims would not be
heard on habeas unless the state courts failed to afford a "full and fair
opportunity" to litigate those claims.8' The particular approach taken in
Stone did not catch on, and so Fourth Amendment claims are the only claims
categorically excluded from the scope of habeas.82 Even so, however, the
theoretical underpinning of Stone-the notion that cost-benefit analysis and
restrictive formulations of the purposes of habeas review could justify
limiting the scope and standard of habeas review-proved to be enormously
influential in later cases.
In a real sense, all subsequent restrictions of habeas corpus, both by the
Court and, in 1996, by Congress, rested squarely on Stone's
reconceptualization of the costs and benefits of habeas corpus. Habeas
corpus was no longer the unitigated good that the Warren Court had taken
it to be; instead, habeas proceedings had substantial costs, and the benefits
were far less than previously supposed.83 This sharp about-face on the
cause-and-prejudice standard was also the mechanism by which the Court narrowed the obligation of
district courts under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), to conduct evidentiary hearings to resolve
disputed questions of fact. In Keeney v. Twnayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), the Court treated a
petitioner's failure to develop facts necessary to his claims on habeas corpus as a default disentitling
him to an evidentiary hearing absent a showing of actual innocence or "cause for his failure to develop
the facts" and "prejudice resulting from that failure.' Id. at 11. The contrary standard from Tomaend,
which the Court deemed a "substantial[] change" from prior law dependent upon the now-repudiated
deliberate-bypass standard from Fay, was expressly overruled. IL at 5 & n.2.
80. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
81. Id. at 481-82. The costs included "diverted [attention] from the ultimate question of guilt or
innocence" and the loss of "reliable and often the most probative" evidence bearing on truth-finding in
criminal trials. Id. at 489. The benefits--an additional deterrent to Fourth Amendment violations-
were "minimal" to the Court, especially "in relation to the costs," because it found little reason to
expect that"law enforcement authorities would fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws in a
search or seizure that went undetected at trial and on appeal." Id. at 493.
82. The Supreme Court has declined to extend Stone to bar any claims other than Fourth
Amendment claims, even those, such as Miranda claims, that often (though, unlike Fourth Amendment
claims, not invariably) exclude probative evidence of guilt. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S.
680 (1993) (refusing to apply Stone to Miranda exclusionary-nle claims); Kimmelman v. Morrison.
477 U.S. 365 (1986) (rejecting the application of Stone to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel);
Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (refusing to read Stone as precluding habeas review of claims of
unconstitutional discrimination in the selection of grand jurors). These post-Stone decisions have
transformed Stone from a potentially important statement about the overriding importance of factual
innocence in habeas doctrine into a narrow principle limited to Fourth Amendment exclusionary-rule
claims.
83. Although the Stone balancing is more than a little formalistic, there was one major reason
for striking a different habeas cost/benefit balance-namely, the country itself had changed
considerably since the time the Warren Court struck the balance in favor of extensive federal
judicial oversight. By the time of the Burger Court, for example, juries rather than lynch mobs
determined guilt or innocence in criminal cases, and trials were not conducted based on appeals to
racism (both because blacks and other minorities were no longer excluded from jury service and, in
many parts of the country, racial attitudes had become a lot more progressive since the days of the
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normative value of broad habeas corpus review paved the way for the
substantial encroachments on habeas corpus that would follow.
The Stone approach reached its apogee in the courts in Teague v.
Lane,84 which is now understood to be the Court's most drastic restriction of
habeas corpus. In Teague, the Court took up, sua sponte, the extent to which
new rules of federal law can be applied "retroactively" in habeas proceedings
arising out of previously conducted trials. Like Justice Powell in Stone,
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion (which almost immediately garnered
majority support)85 drew a sharp distinction between the purposes served by
collateral review and those served by direct review.
In Justice O'Connor's view, the function of habeas corpus is not to
remedy violations of federal law (a function she thought adequately served
by direct review on appeal or certiorari), but instead the substantially more
modest goal of "'deterr[ing]"' gross deviations by state courts from clear,
preexisting constitutional standards. 86  Once a conviction survives direct
Scottsboro Boys). Equally importantly-and perhaps even more so-blacks had been enfranchised
throughout the South as a result of the civil rights movement of the 1960s, giving them the political
power they had historically been denied in America, and state legislatures had been reapportioned to
reflect long-ignored demographic changes. Moreover, by the 1970s, the state judiciary had
changed, with state supreme courts not only willingly applying federal precedents, but also using
their own state constitutions to continue reforming the criminal justice system in ways that the
Supreme Court no longer did with any regularity once the Chief Justiceship passed to Warren
Burger. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 548-51 (1986). That the
Warren Court deserves credit for making much of this possible cannot be doubted; what can be
doubted, and what the Burger Court apparently did question in Stone and other cases, is whether
retention of intrusive federal oversight could be justified once the condition that gave rise to it-
namely, institutional racism in the criminal justice system-receded. As I argue elsewhere, the
Warren Court invited this sort of future reconsideration, and made the Counterrevolution all but
inevitable, by responding to the very real problem of racism in the administration of the criminal
law with broad, race-neutral rules instead of rules tailored specifically to the problem of race. See
Stephen F. Smith, Taking Lessons from the Left?: Judicial Activism of the Right, I GEO. J.L, &
PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 2002).
84. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
85. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,313-14 (1989).
86. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion) ("As [Justice Harlan] had explained in Desist
[v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969)], 'the threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive
for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent
with established constitutional standards. In order to perform this deterrence function.... the habeas
court need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at the time the original proceedings
took place.") (quoting Desist, 394 U.S. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). In this sense, Teague can
be seen as the equivalent of qualified immunity in § 1983 cases-in both cases, federal courts will
withhold a remedy for a constitutional violation if the relevant state actor (the state court in habeas
cases and law enforcement in § 1983 cases) did not violate clearly established federal law. Unlike
qualified immunity under § 1983, where the Court first decides whether a constitutional violation
occurred and only secondarily considers whether the remedy (money damages) should be denied, see
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001), Teague operates as a "threshold" bar to reaching the merits
and, as such, precludes a habeas court from reaching the merits (and thus contributing to the continued
development of constitutional law) unless one of the narrow Teague exceptions applies. Teague, 489
U.S. at 310 (plurality opinion). Thus, Teague has stifled the development of constitutional criminal
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review (and therefore becomes "final"), remedial considerations are eclipsed
on collateral review by "interests of comity and finality."8' Consequently,
"new rules" of federal law, broadly defined as rules not literally "dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final," ss
will not be announced or applied in habeas cases except in two extremely
narrow situations.
89
The dire implications of Teague were soon noticed within the academy.
As Professor Barry Friedman put it: "Teague shuts down the habeas courts.
Where once these courts played an active, important role in defining the
content of criminal procedure, they now can do little but patrol the perimeters
of criminal constitutional law."' 0 This assessment is exaggerated in a
number of senses, but nevertheless right on the mark in terms of the broad,
ominous implications that Teague had for the Warren Court's remedial
vision of habeas corpus.
The federal courts obviously remain open to habeas petitions-to that
extent, they most certainly have not been "shut down." In addition, nothing
in Teague (or elsewhere) prevents the federal courts from making new rules
of constitutional law in federal criminal prosecutions, and in federal and state
cases still pending at the trial level or on direct review, the Court has
specifically mandated retroactive application of all new rules of
constitutional law.91 Still, Professor Friedman's assessment of the
deleterious impact of Teague remains valid in light of the bigger picture.
After all, state courts are where more than ninety percent of the criminal
cases in this country are prosecuted.9 - In that large universe of cases, habeas
corpus is the only real opportunity the federal courts have to define new
principles of constitutional law given the familiar docket constraints on the
Supreme Court Teague, however, takes that opportunity away by limiting
procedure in state criminal cases whereas qualified immunity in § 1983 cases has "facilitate[d]
constitutional change by reducing the costs of innovation." John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Righ-Remedy
Gap in Constitutional Lav, 109 YALE LJ. 87,90(1999).
87. Teague, 489 U.S. at 308 (plurality opinion). A conviction becomes "final" under Teague
when it is immune to reversal on direct appeal in higher courts or on certiorari in the Supreme Court.
l at 295.
88. Id at 301 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
89. The two exceptions allow application of new rules which grant constitutional protection to
primary conduct punished as a violation of criminal law or constitute "watershed rules of criminal
procedure" promoting the accuracy of criminal trials. Id. at 311-14 (plurality opinion).
90. Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REV. 797, 823 (1992). Friedman's
strongly worded view represents the virtually unanimous opinion of criminal procedure scholars. For a
rare kind word from within the academy on Teague, see Hoffman & Stuntz, supra note 29, at 99-104,
who argue that the purpose of habeas should be reconceived as deterring egregious misbehavior by
state courts.
91. See Griffith v. Kentucky,479 U.S. 314,326-28 (1987).
92. In 1998, for example, state courts accounted for 927,717, or roughly 95%, of the nearly
980,000 adult felony convictions. See Criminal Sentencing Statistics, at
http.//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjstsenthtm (last visited Feb. 23,2002).
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habeas to enforcement of absolutely clear-cut preexisting rules of
constitutional law. 93 Given the breadth of the Court's definition of new rules,
it is, as one critic has noted, "virtually impossible" to get past the Teague
bar 4 -and that, of course, was precisely the point.95
Seen in this light, it is difficult to overestimate the effectiveness of the
Counterrevolution in undoing the Warren Court innovations in the area of
habeas corpus. Although habeas corpus remains available for relitigation of
the constitutionality of state-court convictions, reversal on habeas has
become a prospect that state courts simply need not be concerned with in the
vast majority of cases.96 Strict procedural default rules, applicable not only
to the small percentage of criminal cases that result in trials, but also to the
enormous group of cases resolved by guilty pleas, constitute a formidable,
and often insuperable, obstacle to habeas relief in many cases. Even where
no procedural defaults have occurred, Teague essentially means that the
habeas petitioner must lose if there is any conceivable justification for the
state court's ruling in light of prior precedent, however wrong the ruling
might be in light of intervening cases or however illogical the result is in
light of the reasoning of prior cases.
93. The usual response is that the federal courts can still use federal criminal prosecutions as the
vehicle for announcing new rules of constitutional law. The argument, however, rests on an
assumption that is not only undefended but far from obvious-namely, that federal and state cases
are essentially fungible for lawmaking purposes. On closer analysis, federal and state court
prosecutions differ in ways that would render federal criminal cases less than perfect-and, in
certain cases, perhaps even poor-substitutes for state cases. To give but one exmnple, the fact that
state law enforcement agencies have a heavier caseload and less resources than their federal
counterparts should mean, all things being equal, that local police will invest more energy into
getting confessions and state court convictions will be more dependent on confessions than federal
convictions (which will rest, to a greater degree, on independent investigation by government
agents). This means that, from a lawmaking perspective, state cases would be far better vehicles for
regulating confessions or the validity of police interrogation techniques. If this is correct, then it
may be that, contrary to the usual assumption, state and federal criminal prosecutions are not
fungible for lawmaking purposes.
94. Linda Meyer, "Nothing We Say Matters": Teague and New Rules, 61 U. CM, L. REV. 423,424
(1994).
95. For claims that might somehow clear the Teague hurdle, the Court added another obstacle: a
forgiving "harmless error" standard allowing courts greater flexibility in habeas cases to uphold
criminal convictions notwithstanding constitutional error. In Brecht v. Abrahamvon, 507 U.S. 619
(1993), the Court rejected its longstanding assumption that on habeas review, as on direct review under
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), constitutional error will not be deemed "harmless" absent
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict was untainted by the error. Under Brecht, habeas
relief must be denied upon the substantially lesser showing that the state court's constitutional error
had no "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's vendict," Brecht, 507
U.S. at 637-38. This was too restrictive even for Justice O'Connor, the author of Teague and a key
figure in the Counterrevolution-she favored application of the more stringent Chapman standard as a
means of "restor[ing] confidence in the verdict's reliability" following a demonstration of
constitutional error. Id at 652-53 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
96. For example, habeas success rates plummeted from 3 to 4% during the 1970s to 1% by the
early 1990s. See FALLON Er AL., supra note 22, at 1364 (footnotes omitted).
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These important changes to habeas corpus came about only because the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts were as willing as the Warren Court to rethink
prior dogmas about habeas and the proper relationship between federal and
state courts. The view was no longer that habeas was necessary in order for
the federal courts to police states that were presumptively hostile to federal
rights and racial minorities. The presumption was now reversed: state courts
could now be trusted to decide criminal cases fairly and to enforce
constitutional rights. As a result, extensive federal judicial oversight was not
only unnecessary but also potentially harmful to the extent it allowed federal
judges to overturn, based on "technicalities" or second-guessing, convictions
entered against factually guilty defendants at the conclusion of a fair trial.
With this reconceptualization of the costs and benefits of habeas, habeas law
was reformed in ways that moved away from a remedial vision of habeas and
back in the direction of the federal courts performing the role of back-
stopping miscarriages of justice in the state courts-an important role, to be
sure, and a broader one than the federal courts had when habeas was limited
to "jurisdictional" defects. Still, the role was considerably more limited than
habeas corpus had served under the Warren Court. Therefore, the criminal
procedure jurisprudence of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts has proven to be
every bit as "revolutionary" as its predecessor's.
I. "Activism" and the Counterrevolution
Against the backdrop of this case study of how the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts responded to Warren-era precedents in criminal procedure,
the question can now be asked: was it activist for these Courts to refashion
the doctrines of criminal procedure created during the Warren years? This
question cannot be addressed without first developing an understanding of
what activism is. In the following sections, I derive a definition of activism,
apply it to the "counterrevolutionary" Courts, and then move on to larger
normative questions.
A. Understanding Activism
Very little attention has been paid to the meaning of the term activism.
The term serves principally as the utmost judicial put-down, a polemical, if
unenlightening, way of expressing strong opposition to a judicial decision or
approach to judging.97 The problem is that in many cases the accusation of
activism is simply leveled, and readers are left to guess what notion of
97. Richard Posner refers to judicial activism as "a premier term of judicial opprobrium."
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 198 (1985). He ultimately,
however, defines activism in terms that suggest that activism is not inherently improper. See infra note
102 and accompanying text.
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activism the accuser has in mind.98 Another problem with contemporary
usage of activism is that it is usually politically driven-it is a label affixed
only to decisions with which one disagrees on the merits.
99
I start from the premise that whether or not a decision is activist should
not depend on whether the judge is enforcing the "right" values. If broad
exercises of judicial power are acceptable from the Warren Court and from
judges sharing its liberal vision, how can they possibly be illegitimate when
employed by later courts and judges for purposes different from those that
motivated the Warren Court? The Constitution is not a one-way liberal
ratchet any more than it is a one-way conservative or libertarian (or anything
else) ratchet.lte Consequently, I believe that a unitary, neutral definition of
activism-neutral in the sense that it is applicable both to liberal and
conservative judges alike-is essential if activism is to be anything more
than an epithet.
10 1
I think we ought to resist the temptation to jettison activism as an
uninformative epithet and try to rehabilitate the concept of activism as an
effective, nonideological way of criticizing court decisions. Without at least
some common ground on the proper role of judges-as I think can be
captured in a careful, ideologically balanced approach to defining activism-
98. See Bradley C. Canon, A Framework for the Analysis of Judicial Activism, in SUPREME
COURT AcTIVIsM AND RESTRAINT 385 (Stephen C. Halpem & Charles M. Lamb eds., 1982) (noting
that "conceptions of activism are usually not explicitly noted or articulated"). Oddly enough (or,
perhaps, tellingly), the most sustained attention given to defining and studying the phenomenon of
activism has come from political scientists, not law professors. See, e.g., id. at 386-87; GLENDON
SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE COURTS 153-57, 209-13 (rev.
ed. 1974); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR PRECARIOUS
SECURITY? 30-31 (1997).
99. For example, fans of the Revolution often condemn the Rehnquist Court for activism based on
its retrenchment on the "rights revolution" without regard to the fact that those rights were themselves
the product of activism by the Warren Court. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, JudicialActivism of the Right:
A Mistaken and Futile Hope, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 65, 85-86 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990) (noting that liberal
scholars "defend judicial activism on the left by declaring left-wing judicial activists American heroes"
while condemning activism on the right as a "judicial usurpation of lawmaking power"). Needless to
say, many conservatives-have not been as principled as Professor Graglia in condemning conservative
activism. On this issue, as on so many others, there is plenty of hypocrisy to go around.
100. For a general critique of the "one-way-ratchet" approaches to constitutional law, described
(in the terminology of voting-rights law) as "non-retrogression" on rights, see John C. Jeffries, Jr. &
Daryl J. Levinson, The Non-Retrogression Principle in Constitutional Lmv, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1211
(1998). Naturally, all of us have political and moral values and commitments and would therefore
find certain outcomes preferable to others, and debates about the wisdom and morality of legal rules
are to be encouraged. The point here is simply that such disagreements have no place in the
determination of whether a decision is "activist" or not, unless one is content merely to use activism
as shorthand for "I disagree."
101. Another kind of neutrality is important-namely, neutrality as to the correctness of the
underlying decision. One of the problems with current usage of the term "activism" is that it
typically signifies nothing more than disagreement on the merits. As I hope will become clear, my
concept of activism aims to be more than mere shorthand for "I disagree" and thus to achieve this
second kind of neutrality as well as ideological neutrality.
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we run the risk that scholarly discourse will degenerate, as it already has to a
large extent, into insoluble disputes over methods of constitutional
interpretation or competing policy considerations or visions of the good
society. In other words, as the last two generations of constitutional-law
scholarship show, scholars are hopelessly divided on the proper methods of
interpreting the Constitution, and as each election and judicial confirmation
battle in the U.S. Senate reminds us, our society is deeply divided over the
wisdom of issues like abortion and affirmative action. An ideologically
neutral definition of activism may therefore be our last, best hope for
reaching at least some degree of consensus concerning what judges may do
and may not do in our democratic society.
Let me be clear at the outset about my aims and methodology. My goal
is to attempt to derive a definition of activism that preserves the connotation
of condemnation inherent in commonly shared understandings of activism.
At the same time, I try to avoid the ideological bias that almost invariably
hinders reasoned discourse about the concept of activism. To this end, I
strive to incorporate only generally shared intuitions into my basic definition
of activism. To the extent contemporary discussions of activism usually
identify a single judicial philosophy or method of constitutional
interpretation as "correct" and dismiss all others as "activist," my approach
will seem broader. This, however, is only because I am aiming for a
comprehensive, ideologically neutral definition of activism that is not
synonymous with legal incorrectness.
Based on the different definitional approaches taken in the literature,
there appear to be both substantive and procedural dimensions to activism.
The substantive definition of activism encompasses a variety of grounds for
concluding that a decision is, in some sense, illegitimate as opposed to
simply incorrect or misguided. In its procedural version, activism focuses on
the process through which the result was derived, as opposed to the
permissibility of the result reached. I confess at the outset that many of the
key concepts cannot be reduced to crystal-clear definitions, and, as with other
legal concepts, there will be room for argument and disagreement as to their
meaning and proper application; indeed, it is precisely the quest for
simplicity and clarity in addressing the complicated phenomenon of judicial
activism that has led to a number of normatively unsatisfying definitions of
activism. The hope is less that the treatment of activism that follows will
answer lots of the questions than it will identify and stimulate thinking about
the right sorts of questions that bear on a proper understanding of judicial
activism.
With these caveats, I shall proceed to flesh out these two dimensions of
activism (which, incidentally, are equally applicable to questions of
constitutional and statutory interpretation) and address competing
understandings of activism below.
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1. Substantive Activism.-Some have argued that activism results
whenever courts interfere with initiatives of the political branches of
government. Richard Posner has perhaps most clearly articulated this view,
stating that judicial activism involves courts "acting contrary to the will of
the other branches of government" and thereby "taking power from th[osel
other branches.' '102  It is true, of course, that judicial interference, usually
manifested and most easily seen in the form of judicial invalidation of
statutes, is strongly correlated with periods of heightened activism.10 3 Even
so, equating "conflict" or "interference" with activism rests on an unwar-
ranted assumption-namely, that the federal courts are supposed to be
inactive rather than active but restrained.
There is a critical distinction between an "activist" court, on the one
hand, and an "active" court, on the other. A court faithful to principles of
judicial restraint could never be activist (at least not in a first-best world) but
would nevertheless be quite active in demanding that other branches of
government remain within their proper constitutional bounds. °4 It could
hardly be otherwise given Marbury v. Madison,0 5 which held that enforcing
the Constitution is an essential part of the "judicial Power" vested in the
federal courts by Article ]11.106
102. POSNER, supra note 97, at 210; see also, e.g., Glendon Schubert, A Functional Interpretation,
in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM VS. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 17
(David F. Forte ed., 1972) (noting that a court "is activist whenever its policies are in conflict with
those of other major decision-makers").
103. During the Lochner era, for example, the Supreme Court invalidated close to two hundred
economic regulatory statutes as contrary to the Due Process Clause. See STONE ET AL., supra note 15,
at 739. The fact that the "Old Men" struck down so many statutes is usually taken as clear proof of
activism, which explains why critics of the Rehnquist Court often stress the number of statutes it has
invalidated. See, e.g., An Activist Court Mixes Its High-Profile Messages, WASH. POST, July 2, 2000,
2000 WL 19617335 ("According to Walter Dellinger, a former solicitor general in the Clinton
administration .... the Rehnquist court has invalidated 24 acts of Congress in the past five years. 'If
that's not a record, it's close to it,' he said."). Critics also are quick to compare the current Court to the
Lochner Court. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting
a "striking" similarity between the Rehnquist Court's sovereign-immunity decisions and "the
Lochner era's industrial due process" and predicting that "the Court's late foray into immunity
doctrine will prove the equal of its earlier experiment in laissez-faire, the one being as unrealistic as
the other, as indefensible, and probably as fleeting"). Needless to say, the comparison is not intended
to be flattering.
104. I limit the claim about judicial restraint precluding activism to the "first-best" world because,
as I argue later in this Article, even a judge who firmly believes in judicial restraint might properly take
action deemed activist in a "second-best" world as a means of counteracting activism (liberal or
conservative) by his colleagues. In the second-best world, activism in response to activism-what I
call reactivism-may actually help replicate results consistent with judicial restraint to the extent
Justices are unwilling to overturn prior activist precedents in a particular context. See infra notes 198-
222.
105. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
106. Id. at 178 ("So if a law be in opposition to the constitution: if both the law and the
constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide that case conformably to
the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law,.,
the constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.").
Naturally, one could legitimately argue that Marbury was wrong, and those who would prefer to
1080
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Once the implications of judicially enforceable constitutionalism are
understood, it becomes clear that Posner's definition of activism is both
overinclusive and underinclusive. It is overinclusive because courts are
supposed to strike down unconstitutional action by other branches. Given
Marbury, it would be odd to view invalidations of statutes as inherently
activist.10 7 Posner's definition is underinclusive as well because interference
with other branches is not a necessary condition of judicial activism. Again,
Marbury suggests the reason.
Once constitutionalism, of the judicially enforceable variety, is accepted
as a bedrock principle of American governance, the thought of judges being
permitted either to act in contravention of the "fundamental and paramount
law" that is the Constitution or to authorize other government actors to do so
is unsurpassingly strange.10 8  Alexander Hamilton said it well: American-
allocate all or almost all decisionmaking authority to the political branches might well find an
inactive judiciary to be considerably more congenial than active but restrained judiciary or the
judiciary that we presently have. Rather than argue these broader points concerning institutional
choice, I simply accept judicially enforced constitutionalism as envisioned in Marbury as a given
and try to derive a concept of judicial activism that flows from the features of that brand of
constitutionalism.
107. Perhaps in recognition of this point, Professor Graglia endorses the classic Thayerian
position that it is proper for courts to act only when a constitutional transgression is clear-that, in
other words, it is "activist" to invalidate actions of the political branches unless the Constitution
"clearly prohibit[s]" such actions. See Lino A. Graglia, It's Not Constitutionalism, It's Judicial
Activism, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 293, 296 (1996); see generally James B. Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 151 (1893). The
source of that limitation on judicial power, however, is far from apparent. Surely, it is not the
Constitution or any theory of interpretation. As Professor Lawson has said, when it comes to how
clear a constitutional violation must be before a court can act, "there is nothing in the nature of
interpretation, of originalism, or of the Constitution that can provide the answer." Gary Lawson,
Legal Indeterminacy: Its Cause and Cure, 19 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411, 422 (1996).
Although, as a matter of opinion-writing rhetoric, Chief Justice John Marshall offered examples of
clear constitutional violations (e.g., a one-witness treason statute in violation of the two-witness rule
contained in U.S. CONST. art. Ell, § 3, cl. 1) in Marbury in the course of justifying judicial review,
see Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179, there was no suggestion that judicial review is limited to
correcting clear constitutional transgressions. Indeed, quite the opposite: the judicial duty to "say
what the law is" means, as Marshall put it, that courts "must of necessity ewpound and interpret" the
Constitution, actions that encompass far more than enforcement of clear constitutional mandates.
Id. at 177 (emphasis added). Moreover, limiting judicial review to clear cases of unconstitutionality
would essentially transform Article III courts from restrained but nonetheless "active" players in the
constitutional order into inactive (and hence virtually irrelevant) ones. Any doubt on this score is
dispelled by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). By limiting habeas courts to enforcement of
preexisting constitutional mandates that are clear both in their meaning and their application to the
particular case, Teague has all but ended any meaningful role for habeas courts. See supra notes
84-95 and accompanying text. The same phenomenon would occur if a clear constitutional
violation were the only proper basis for exercising judicial review-which is not to say that there
are no "easy" constitutional cases (there are), but only that those cases are not the ones that are
litigated. Graglia himself all but confesses the point elsewhere, noting that "examples of enacted
law clearly in violation of the Constitution are extremely difficult to find." Graglia. supra note 99,
at 67.
108. But see Graglia, supra note 107, at 296 (arguing that"it is not activism for judges to refuse to
act by declining to disallow a policy choice and permitting the results of the political process to
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style judicial review "supposes that the power of the people is superior to
both [the judicial and legislative power], and that where the will of the
legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people,
declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter
rather than the former."1°9 As a result, unless one rejects the notion of
intergenerational fidelity to the Constitution, there is no principled basis on
which courts might prefer policy choices embodied in statutes over those
embodied in the Constitution itself.'10
"Dead-hand" theorists do, of course, reject the notion that present
generations ought to be "ruled from the grave," especially by (white) men
who inhabited a vastly different world and whose ideologies were radically
different from our own.' If this argument is accepted, and federal judges
stand"). For clarity, I should note that in my view a decision may be contrary to the Constitution in
either of two ways. First, a decision can be contradicted by the constitutional text. An example of this
kind of constitutional incongruence is the exemption in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), of
"petty crimes" from the reach of the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right. See supra notes 12-15 and
accompanying text. Second, a decision, though not inconsistent with any particular provision of the
text, can be contrary to inferences from constitutional structure. Decisions such as INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983), where the Court invalidated the one-house legislative veto, and U.S. Term Linits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), which struck down state-imposed term limits for members of
Congress, are examples of cases where the Supreme Court has resolved constitutional questions based
on inferences drawn from constitutional structure.
109. THE FEDERALISTNO. 78, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
110. It is true that other government officials outside of the judicial branch, including the president
and members of Congress, take the same oath as judges to uphold the Constitution. The fact that such
officials must, in theory at least, interpret the Constitution in the performance of their own duties does
not suggest that courts should defer to their self-interested presumptive determinations of
constitutionality. As Marbury held, "[it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. Even critics of judicial
supremacy are virtually unanimous in the view that, however erroneous court decisions may be as a
matter of constitutional or statutory interpretation, "particular judgments must be enforced-even
knowing that, for practical purposes, this gives the Court the last word so long as it adheres to its
judgments as a matter of stare decisis." Larry D. Kramer, We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 7
(2001). In any event, I find it difficult to believe that political actors worry very much about the
niceties of constitutional law. Under normal circumstances, the expectation would be that political
gain is the dominant motivation for legislators and other political actors and thus that they will perform
acts that courts would probably deem unconstitutional, such as criminalizing flag-buming, where there
is sufficient political mileage to be gained. If true, this only bolsters the justification for independent
judicial review of constitutional questions. See generally Steven Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88
Nw. U. L. REV. 269, 272-75 (1993) (arguing that courts are, on balance, better constitutional
interpreters than legislatures). For an interesting set of proposals to improve congressional
performance as constitutional interpreters, see Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Venneule, Institutional
Design ofa Thayerian Congress, 50 DUKE L.J 1277 (2001).
111. My colleague Mike Klarman has pursued thought-provoking inquiries along these lines. See
Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 381 (1997). He argues that, whether the reference
point is constitutional text or intentionalism, the Constitution does not "deserve our fidelity" and that
society should not "be ruled from the grave." Il at 381. Several other liberal scholars have recently
joined Klarman in calling for abolition of judicial review. See MARK TUSHINE, TAKING THE
CONSTIrUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999); DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF
ADJUDICATION (1997). Note that intergenerational fidelity is also an issue as to statutes, which retain
the force and effect of law long after the Congress that passed them has gone out of existence and the
legislators who wrote and voted for them have gone to the grave. For example, during the 2000
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are not to be bound by any constraint that smacks of dead-hand control, then,
as a descriptive matter, there would seem to be no meaningful limits on the
power of the judiciary. True, political controls over the courts would remain,
such as naming new judges to fill judicial vacancies, impeachment and
removal, and overruling activist rulings by constitutional amendments. These
political checks, however, have failed to constrain even the most pronounced
periods of counter-majoritarian activism in our history, including the Lochner
era and the Warren Court Revolution.'
12
Absent external constraints on the power of judges, a strong normative
argument could be made that society would be better off without judicial
review. Allowing judges to wield unlimited power over the lives, liberty,
and property of citizens, not to mention the prerogatives of other branches of
government, would offend traditional American conceptions of the rule of
law, which are founded on the proposition that ours is a "government of
laws, not of men."113  Again, the point was not lost on the founding
presidential election when it appeared there could be two different slates of electors sent from Florida,
America was prepared to have its next president selected under an obscure statute, the Electoral Count
Act, 3 U.S.C. § 5, that was passed in the wake of the disputed Tilden-Hayes presidential election of
1876. A dead-hand theorist might object to that degree of dead-hand control-why should an 1876
statute govern who would become president more than a century later? On the other hand, however,
there is undeniably value in having ex ante rules in place to deal with high-stakes battles like
presidential election contests. See Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons from the 2000 Presidential
Election, 29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 975,976-86 (2001).
112. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 46-48 (1980). That said, it may well be that, in both instances, political checks did work by
preventing even more aggressive and sustained exercises in activism than those that actually occurred.
Though certainly plausible, this does not detract from my central point but rather serves to underscore
it: the fact that the Loclner and Warren Courts were able to be activist in such controversial and
politically unpopular ways for so long, and in the face of opposition by presidents as politically
powerful as Franklin D. Roosevelt and Dwight D. Eisenhower, leaves little room for confidence in the
effectiveness of political controls as deterrents to judicial activism. See Michacl J. Klarman, The
Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 775 (1991) (arguing that
political controls ensure only that "Supreme Court Justices will not behave like Martians"). Needless
to say, the appointment power can bring periods of particularly pronounced activism to an end (as it
did for the Warren era), but only after it has already taken place. By then, however, the damage may
be irreversible-legislation may have been declared unconstitutional, for example, and the interest-
group bargains that won enactment of the invalidated legislation may have dissipated--and the activist
decisions are cloaked with the protective mantle of stare decisis. See ELY, supra, at 47.
113. According to a recent exposition on the rule of law, "[t]he essence of the Hume-Adams
opposition of 'government of laws' to 'government of men'-the core conception of the rule of law-
is that something other than the mere will of the individuals deputized to exercise government powers
must have primacy." RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OFLAW IN AMERICA 3 (2001). Although there are
differing conceptions of the rule of law, the ideal described by Professor Cass is commonplace in
contemporary discussions of the rule of law. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of La,"
As a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (1997) (noting that "leading
modem accounts" of the rule of law all subscribe to "the supremacy of legal authority" and therefore
posit that "law should rule officials, including judges, as well as ordinary citizens" (emphasis added)).
This is not to deny that judges often have considerable discretion-clearly, they do-and such
discretion is not, in itself, inconsistent with the rule of law. For the rule of law to exist, however, them
must be at least sone legal constraint, even if imperfect, on the individual actor and that restraint must
be "embodied in authority outside the control of (external to) the individual exercising legal power."
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generation: "The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should
be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The
observation, if it proved any thing, would prove that there ought to be no
judges distinct from that body."' 1 4
There are also functional objections to judicial review unconstrained by
constitutional text. There is little reason for faith in the institutional com-
petence of courts, as compared to legislative bodies, to make the intensely
value-laden judgments or policy calls required by "noninterpretive" judicial
review. The federal judiciary is far from representative of society as a
whole,115 nor is it free from the "public-choice" problems that make
legislatures less than ideal guardians of the public interest. 16  In short, if
what the courts are doing is neither "law" nor constrained by law, then
lawyers in robes-which, after all, is all judges are-should be just about the
last people we want doing it.
117
This combination of formal and functional objections may explain why
there is broad agreement (even from nonoriginalist quarters) that
constitutional text must be binding on judges. As Professor Tom Grey has
declared: "We are all interpretivists; the real arguments are not over whether
judges should stick to interpreting, but over what they should interpret and
what interpretive attitudes they should adopt."118  The breadth of this
CASS, supra, at 18; see generally id. at 4-19 (explaining the four necessary conditions for the rule of
law); Fallon, supra, at 36-38. Even this minimal external legal constraint on judges would be
nonexistent if, as dead-hand theorists propose, constitutional text, original intention, and tradition
should play no role in constitutional adjudication-all that is left as a basis for judicial decisionmaking,
on that view, is the judge's own sense of the good.
114. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For a
more modem argument along these lines, see Klarman, supra note 111, at 412-15,
115. See generally Michael J. Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L.
REV. 145, 189-90 (1998) ("Justices of the United States Supreme Court, indeed of any state or fedcral
appellate court, are overwhelmingly upper-middle or upper-class and extremely well educated, usually
at the nation's more elite universities. Moreover, unlike legislators who generally share a similar
cultural background, federal judges enjoy a relative political insulation which significantly reduces any
offsetting obligation to respond to the non-elite political preferences of their constituents.").
116. See generally Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L. 31 (1991).
117. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, What's So SpecialAbout Judges?, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 773,
782(1990).
118. Thomas Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984); see generally
STONE ET AL., supra note 15, at 296 ("Almost all commentators believe that the text of the
Constitution is binding."). "Interpretivists" believe that judges "should confine themselves to
enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution"; "noninterpretivists,"
on the other hand, contend that "courts should go beyond that set of references and enforce norms
that cannot be discovered within the four corners of the document." ELY, supra note 112, at 1. As
the Grey quotation suggests, even proponents of the broadest theories of constitutional adjudication
bristle at the suggestion that they favor a noninterpretive role for the courts, and so the terms
"interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism" have fallen into disuse lately. What is significant for
present purposes, however, is not the terminology but rather what terminological dispute tells us
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consensus among believers in judicial review weakens any objection that
building textualism into my definition of activism strips it of the ideological
neutrality I seek.119 Even if this point of view requires commitment to a
"preconstitutional rule" positing the controlling nature of the Constitution,
that rule seems so thoroughly uncontroversial, and is so widely accepted, as
to be unproblematic for present purposes.120
The interpretive-fidelity aspect of activism would be unduly
impoverished if it required only that judges not violate clear text in, or clear
inferences from, the Constitution. Although the scope of matters decided by
the Supreme Court over the last few generations in the name of the
Constitution might reasonably lead one to the opposite conclusion, in point
of fact the Constitution itself speaks only to a narrow range of issues. Given
that our populist Constitution delineates only the "great outlines" of our
government and therefore lacks the "prolixity of a legal code,'' it would
hardly be much of a constraint if all judges are bound to do, from the
standpoint of interpretive fidelity, is to avoid contravention of clear
constitutional mandates. It is also necessary that a decision actually find
some affirmative support in the Constitution, whether in its language or
structure. Only in that instance can a court plausibly claim that it is
enforcing the Constitution instead of its own policy preferences or, in the
language of the Founding generation, that it is exercising "judgment" instead
of "will."
12 2
about textualism: the very fact that constitutional theorists and judges are so unwilling to be viewed
as being "against" interpreting the Constitution as written, and are so willing to rely on textual
argument when it supports their positions, shows the privileged place that textualism deservedly
holds in constitutional theory. As Professor Amar has recently written. "[t]extualism, broadly
understood, is woven into the fabric of conventional constitutional interpretation" Akihil Reed
Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26,34 (2000). Reflecting this consensus
view, Professor Fallon places fidelity to text at the highest rung of interpretive values, asserting that
"[wlhere compelling arguments from text unambiguously require a conclusion, the text must be held
dispositive." Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,A Constructivist Coherence 77teory of Constitutional Interpretation,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1244 (1987).
119. By "textualism," I intend the usual meaning of that approach to constitutional
interpretation, which involves discerning the meaning and implications of the words used in the
Constitution and deriving meaning from constitutional structure. See generally Amar, supra note 2
at 28-33. This, of course, is not the only possible understanding of textualism. One considerably
broader, value-laden approach would require judges to adopt a "moral" reading of the Constitution.
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
120. Given this consensus that the Constitution is law, not to mention the fact that this notion lies at
the very foundation of our system of judicially enforceable constitutionalism under Alarbuty %. Madison.
I find it unnecessary here to advance a political or moral justification for fidelity to text or the broader
yet related ideal of the rule of law. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the rule of law enjoys "universal
attraction" (except, one supposes, among tyrants) because it "pulls society in the direction of knowable,
predictable, rnle-based decision making, toward limitations on the power entrusted to government
officials, toward alignment of power with legitimacy." CASS, supra note 113, at 19.
121. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316,407 (1819).
122. See THEFEDERALISTNO. 78, at469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961).
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Until now, this discussion of the interpretive-fidelity aspect of activism
has rested on an implicit assumption that should be laid bare before moving
on to other issues. A key principle motivating my attempt to define activism
has been that the concept should be more than shorthand for a claim that a
decision is legally incorrect. For this reason, I have defined the interpretive-
fidelity component of activism solely in terms of a decision's permissibility
in light of text and structure, which I regard as ideologically neutral because
of the broad consensus that the Constitution itself (and, in statutory cases, the
legislation that becomes law) is binding on judges.
Where the text is plain and unambiguous, of course, this approach
dictates only one permissible (i.e., nonactivist) outcome-namely, that
required by the language or structure. If, however, the text is indeterminate,
a range of potential interpretive options will be available to a court, some of
which will be disqualified by text or structure alone and others not. In that
case, any choice the court makes among the range of permissible
interpretations (that is to say, of interpretations not disqualified by text or
structure) will not be activist in terms of fidelity to text, even though the
correctness of its choice will certainly be debatable on the merits. 123 In other
words, all the interpretive-fidelity definition of activism does is delimit the
bounds within which judges have discretion; as long as they do not transgress
those bounds, their resulting decisions will not be activist from the standpoint
of interpretive fidelity. 124
123. This concept of a range of permissible outcomes has antecedents throughout the law. Under
Teague, a habeas court takes the state court's resolution of a constitutional issue and determines
whether it was within the range of permissible outcomes under previously established federal caselaw.
See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305-10 (1989) (holding that permissible interpretations of
previously existing caselaw will not be overturned on habeas). The same basic analytical inquiry is
made on qualified-inmunity issues in suits seeking money damages under § 1983-did the officer
exceed the bounds of permissible state action delineated by prior caselaw? See Harlow v, Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982) (applying an objective reasonableness standard in determining whether a
government official's conduct will be immune from § 1983 damages liability). Administrative law
provides yet another example: "Chevron deference" requires courts to accept an administrative
agency's interpretation of a statute committed to its administration as long as it represents a
"permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842 (1984). In all these areas, the law recognizes that a constitutional text or a statutory text,
while ruling out a number of interpretive options as impermissible, may nevertheless leave a range of
other interpretive options open and that the text may give no indication as to which of the options
within the range is the "right" one. For a helpful elaboration of this concept, see Caleb Nelson, Stare
Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 5-8 (2001).
124. It bears emphasis that the written text-and only the written text-determines the range of
permissible interpretive outcomes. This is important to the neutrality of the interpretive-fidelity
category of activism because it does not prefer any of the competing methods of resolving textual
ambiguity. So, in the case of constitutional interpretation, originalists can look to the intent of the
Framers in resolving ambiguity, and nonoriginalists can utilize natural law, representation-
reinforcement, or other theories of interpretation. As long as the results reached do not contravene
the text, the decision will not be considered activist on interpretive-fidelity grounds. This, of
course, will leave considerable room for judicial discretion in confronting open-ended constitutional
terms like "due process" or "unreasonable" searches and seizures. My concept of activism,
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Another definition of activism looks to the willingness of a court "to use
its authority to engage in judicial review in an assertive manner" by, for
example, overruling or limiting prior precedents and announcing previously
unknown innovations in doctrine.12s As with invalidation of statutes, the fact
that a court overrules lots of cases and announces lots of new constitutional
mandates is a red flag that activism may well be afoot. 26 This insight,
however, is difficult to translate into a concrete definition of activism. It is
correct that if a court finds scores of new constitutional mandates that prior
courts did not manage to see, or if a court overturns lots of prior rulings, it is
likely (but nevertheless not inevitable) that what is driving the later Court is
not the Constitution but rather the court's own policy preferences. Even so,
there is unfortunately no way to determine how many overrulings, or how
many new doctrinal pronouncements, are "too much."
Moreover, in terms of fidelity to precedent, it would be too blunt to
posit, as the assertiveness model does, that overrulings are invariably activist.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that "[s]tare decisis is not an
inexorable command," particularly "in constitutional cases, because in such
cases 'correction through legislative action is practically impossible. ' 122
Given that overrulings are specifically permitted, in appropriate cases, by
stare decisis doctrine, the fact that decisions are overruled cannot, on its own,
constitute proof of activism.
Activism may be shown, so far as fidelity to precedent is concerned, by
looking to the reasons advanced for the overruling. Stare decisis rules
emphasize that decisions may not be overruled simply because they are
considered to be wrong by a later courtL' Instead, in both constitutional and
however, is multi-faceted, so the relevant question is not how much the limitations in one particular
type of activism would constrain judicial discretion, but rather the cffect of the various elements of
the definition of activism as a whole.
125. FREDERICK P. LEwis, Tim CONTEXT OF JUDICIAL AcnvmM: THE ENDURANCE OF THE
WARREN COURT LEGACY IN A CONSERVATIVE AGE 7 (1999). I refer to this as the "assertiveness
moder' ofjudicial activism.
126. Indeed, conservative attacks on the Warren Court pointed to the sheer number of overmlings
that occurred during Warren's tenure as proof positive that activism was at work. For example, in
Harper v. Virginia Deparnment of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993), Justice Scalia criticized the Warren era
as a time "marked by a newfound disregard for stare decisis," one in which "this Court cast overboard
numerous settled decisions, and indeed even whole areas of law, with an unceremonious 'heave-ho.'"
Id. at 108-09 (concurring opinion).
127. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991); see, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,
235 (1997). In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the Court emphatically stated
that "[o]ur precedents are not sacrosanct," noting that "we have overruled prior decisions where the
necessity and propriety of doing so has been established." I at 172.
128. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 123, at 2 (noting that the "conventional wisdom" is that "a
purported demonstration of error is not enough to justify overruling a past decision"). The Rehnquist
Court has been something of a paradox on stare decisis. On the one hand, the Court has bolstered
the force of precedent by holding that prior precedents should be retained unless there is "special
justification" for an overruling, which, as Professor Amar has shown, marked a considerable change
from prior judicial practice. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Document and the Doctrine, 114
HARV. L. REV. 26, 81-82 (2000). On the other hand, the Rehnquist Court has stressed that, even
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statutory cases, "special justification" is required before a court can properly
jettison prior precedent.12 9
Given current stare decisis doctrine, a decision that overrules prior
precedent without advancing special justification for doing so, or only upon
an implausible demonstration of special justification, should be deemed
activist. This is so because rules of stare decisis, though often (but only
partially accurately) described as wise judicial "policy," cannot be casually
ignored whenever a court deems fit; rather, they are themselves
"authoritative legal rules," albeit rules that do not purport to be of
constitutional dimension.130  It would therefore be improper for a court to
disregard those rules, assuming that the concept of stare decisis is not itself
unconstitutional.1
3
'
after the Warren era, overrulings have not been exceptional occurrences, noting in Payne t.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991), that "the Court has during the past 20 Terms overruled in whole or
in part 33 of its previous constitutional decisions." Id. at 828.
129. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 172 (statutory case); see also Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203,
212 (1984) (holding that, even in constitutional cases, "any departure from tie doctrine of stare
decisis demands special justification"). In deciding whether to overrule prior cases, the Court
typically looks to various policy considerations, including (1) the workability of prior decisional
law, (2) the extent of reliance on the prior decision, (3) whether the prior doctrine's theoretical
foundations have been undermined by later cases, and (4) whether factual circumstances critical to
the prior decision have changed. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992). For a
good general discussion of these policy factors, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare
Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE
L.J. 1535, 1551-64 (2000). My colleague Caleb Nelson has argued in an interesting recent article
that stare decisis rules should be modified so that "demonstrable error" is again recognized as an
independent ground for overturning precedent. See Nelson, supra note 123, at 3; see also Amar,
supra note 128, at 78-89 & n.28. Given my view that it is activist for judges to disregard clear
constitutional or statutory text, I agree that stare decisis doctrine should be revised to recognize
clear or demonstrable error as a valid basis for overruling a prior precedent assuming there are no
extraordinarily strong reliance interests counseling adherence to prior law.
130. John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503, 508
(2000).-. It is partially accurate to describe stare decisis rules as policy, as my colleague Professor
Harrison has explained, because they are "influenced by and reflect policy considerations." Id. This,
however, is true of any rule of law. For example, one element of due process is that a person cannot be
criminally punished without being afforded a fair trial. The rule that a fair triad is the "price" for
infliction of criminal punishment is undoubtedly influenced by policy considerations (primarily, the
importance of avoiding conviction of innocent people), yet it would be strange to say that due process
itself is a "policy." Rather, it, like stare d6cisis, is a rule of law that serves potcy interests. Thus,
"[w]hen judges say they are bound by precedent," the assertion should be taken to "mean that they are
following actual rules and not ignoring the law because they believe that applying it would be
undesirable." Ia at 508-09.
131. See infra notes 213-19 and accompanying text. There is a sense in which it may seem
circular to say that court-made stare decisis rules should determine the propriety of overrulings, but
that is only because the Framers did not, and Congress has not of yet seen fit to, speak to the issue
of precedent. Despite their judicial origin, stare decisis rules are "authoritative legal rules" that
judges cannot properly disregard. See Harrison, supra note 130, at 505. Similarly, a court's
handling of precedent should be considered activist if the court is less than forthright in its treatment of
precedent, such as by distinguishing cases on immaterial grounds or misconstruing statements in prior
decisions to avoid having to disavow or adhere to the prior decisions. (For what may be all-time lows
on these points, see Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), and Pau v. Davis, 424 U.S.
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With this analysis, I can finally offer a substantive definition of
activism. A decision is "substantively activist" if the result (1) lacks
affirmative support in, or is outside the range of permissible outcomes
delineated by, the constitutional or statutory text or structure, (2) is reached
by overruling prior binding precedent without adequate justification in light
of applicable stare decisis rules, or (3) is arrived at by distinguishing or
otherwise limiting precedents on immaterial grounds. In each instance, the
necessary implication is that the judges rendered a decision they were not
entitled to make. Substantive activism often will, but need not, result in
conflict between the judiciary and the political branches of government,
measured in terms of invalidation of action undertaken by other branches
(including statutes or criminal convictions), or overrulings.
The ideological neutrality of this definition is plain in that it does not
privilege certain approaches to constitutional interpretation or political
outcomes over others: only plain emanations from text and structure must be
heeded, and even then only because of the broad consensus that judges
cannot properly reach results that the Constitution plainly forbids. What may
not be so obvious is that this definition of substantive activism is, in
substantial measure, neutral as between correct and incorrect outcomes as
well. Interpretations that are consistent with the written text bearing on any
given point are not activist even though one might well believe one of those
interpretations to be "right" and the others "wrong"; in this instance, there
will be legally incorrect decisions that should not be considered to be activist.
Similarly, given that precedent factors into the definition of substantive
activism, there will be instances where a decision is correct as an original
matter, but nevertheless should be deemed activist in light of prior judicial
decisions on the subject. 132 It is only where a decision is activist because it
lies outside the range of textually permissible interpretations that an activist
decision is necessarily wrong. Therefore, the definition of substantive
activism outlined here is not necessarily equivalent to an allegation of error
693 (1976).) This mode of decisionmaldng is activist because it is a departure from the normal
common-law model of adjudication, in which the applicable law "arises" from the facts considered to
be material in the case. Where the material facts in a present case are the same as in a past case, then
the common-law model, coupled with rules of stare decisis, require the same result in both cases,
unless there is a legally valid reason (ie., a reason other than mcre disagreement on the merits, see
Nelson, supra note 123, at 2) for overturning the prior case. Naturally, there will be room for
disagreement about whether a fact was "material" in a prior case or not, but that problem is one that
runs throughout the common law-which presumably is one reason (other than mere sadism) that law
professors torture their students with hypotheticals and exam questions that challenge students to figure
out the facts that are material to ajudicial decision.
132. Of course, it is possible to argue that, in a system based on precedent, prior rulings are
themselves law, so that a decision that correctly interprets a written text is nevertheless incorrect if
prior rulings have adopted a different interpretation. The more traditional way of viewing precedent
is that it is merely "evidence" of what the law is, albeit evidence that is rebuttably presumed correct
and therefore to be accepted as conclusive absent a valid reason for not doing so. See generally
Amar, supra note 128, at 87.
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and, in many of its applications, simply will not speak to the correctness of
the decision or interpretation in question.
2. Procedural Activism.-The procedural aspects of activism can be
derived more briefly because there is less disagreement about how to
measure proper judicial conduct once substantive outcomes are taken out of
the picture. At its core, procedural activism preserves the separation of
powers between the federal courts and the political branches of government.
The basic insight here is that even though courts, like legislatures, in an
important sense make law, courts are required to do so in a distinctive way,
one that is markedly different from the way in which legislative bodies make
law. Unlike Congress, Article III courts are not self-starting institutions; they
may make law only if, and to the extent that, Congress has authorized them
to decide a particular dispute within the bounds delineated in Article III and a
litigant has properly invoked their jurisdiction. 133 Once a dispute has been
properly brought before a federal court, the issue has to be "justiciable," or
capable of judicial resolution on principled, nonpolitical grounds; to the
extent that the claim is not justiciable, the matter must be left for resolution,
if at all, by the political branches of government.
1 34
Even if the ultimate issue in a case is justiciable and subsumed within a
valid grant of jurisdiction by Congress, there is the further requirement that
courts may make law only to the extent necessary to decide the case.
Resolving cases or controversies is the institutional responsibility of the
federal courts, and, as Marbury v. Madison established, judicial review is
permitted only as a necessary concomitant to their case-resolution
function. 35  For this reason, the federal courts may not issue advisory
opinions 136 or otherwise decide legal questions outside of the confines of a
case or controversy, such as where the plaintiff invoking the court's
133. The lower federal courts, being creatures of statute, have only the jurisdiction affirmatively
given them by Congress within the bounds delineated in Article m. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
441 (1850). With the Supreme Court, the analysis is different, but the end result is similar because a
congressional grant of jurisdiction in the initial action is required for the Court to exercise its appellate
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court owes its existence to the Constitution, not Congress, and, as such, the
Court alone is "vested" with jurisdiction by the Constitution. U.S. CONsT. art. Ill, § 1; see &, parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). The Constitution gives the Court original jurisdiction in
certain cases and in all others appellate jurisdiction "with such Exceptions... as the Congress shall
make." U.S. CONST. art. iT, § 2, cl. 2. "It is generally accepted that Congress has 'excepted' from
Supreme Court jurisdiction all cases that do not fall within an affirmative statutory grant." PErER W.
Low & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 223
(4th ed. 1998) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. i[, § 2, cl. 2).
134. "A controversy is nonjusticiable-i.e., involves a political question-where there is 'a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it."' Nixon v. United States, 506
U.S. 224,228 (1993) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962)).
135. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
136. See, e.g., Preiserv. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395,401 (1975).
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jurisdiction lacks standing to do so137 or the plaintiffs claim has become
moot.138  In Bickel's phrasing, these assorted justiciability limitations on the
federal courts guard against activism by requiring the courts to practice the
"passive virtues."
139
Ever since Bickel advanced the concept, the passive virtues have come
under sustained scholarly criticism because, in the view of critics, they would
impede Supreme Court intervention in controversial areas where the Court
should be heard. 4° This view became so widespread within the academy that
it was difficult, until very recently, to find constitutional law theorists who
regard the passive virtues as anything other than a quaint, and long-since
outmoded, conception of the judicial function. As Professor Stephen Carter
has noted-with, one hopes, at least some degree of overstatement--"[ffew
scholars, and virtually no judges, seem to believe any longer in the passive
virtues."
141
Interestingly, the passive virtues may be undergoing a rebirth of sorts in
the literature in the torrent of academic criticism of Bush v. Gore,42 in which
the Supreme Court halted Florida's chaotic manual recount of presidential
ballots and, with it, Vice President Gore's 2000 bid for the White House. To
137. See, eg., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818-20 (1997). If the plaintiff can demonstrate the
requisite injury-in-fact for Article II standing but the injury depends on contingent future events, the
case may be dismissed on "ripeness" grounds, and review delayed until such time as the requisite injuy
comes more squarely into focus. See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co, 473 US. 568, 580-
81(1994).
138. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 US. 167, 189-93
(2000).
139. See BICKEL, supra note 7, at 111-98.
140. For example, Michael Dorf has recently argued that the passive virtues are objectionable to
the extent they would interfere with the Supreme Court's ability to "use its bully pulpit to articulate a
broad moral vision." Michael C. Dorf, The Lbnits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L REv. 4. 13
(1998). In less political terms, Neal Katyal has argued, both normatively and descriptively, for a brood
conception of the judicial role in which courts give nonbinding advice to other branches of government.
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges As Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L REV. 1709 (1998). The leading
proponent of the view that the passive virtues would unduly restrict the role of the Supreme Court is
Gerald Gunther. See Gerald Gunther, 77e Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L REV. 1 (1964).
141. Stephen L. Carter, Religious Freedom Asf Religion Matters: A Tribute to Justice Brennan, 87
CAi. L. REV. 1059, 1073 n28 (1999). A notable exception is Cass Sunstein, who breathed new
academic life into the passive virtues with his Harvard Foreword entitled Leaving Things Undecided,
110 HARV. L. REV. 6 (1996) [hereinafter, Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided]. See also CAss R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMAuSM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999). Professor
Sunstein's concept of minimalism looks favorably upon Bickel's passive virtues but nonetheless
envisions a considerably narrower role for courts in the resolution of controversial public-policy issues.
Sunstein prefers that such issues be resolved democratically through the political branches rather than by
the courts, whereas Bickel's passive virtues were largely ways for the Supreme Court to avoid weighing
in on such issues until the appropriate time for authoritative judicial resolution. See Sunstein, Leaving
77Tngs Undecided, supra, at 8 n.8. For a critical review of the'New Minimalism"--which, as Sunstein
confesses, is really a rediscovery of "a range of old ideas." Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, stpra,
at 7; see Christopher L Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimnalism, 100 COLUIM. L REV. 1454
(2000).
142. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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the Court's many critics, the Court did more than simply give the wrong
answer to the legal questions presented in Bush v. Gore; it actually took a
case it had no business deciding in the first place and therefore, in Bickel's
terms, failed to practice the passive virtues by letting the proceedings
continue uninterrupted in the Florida courts, the Florida Legislature, and, if
necessary, Congress. 143 Thus, as bad as the Florida election ordeal was for
late-night television, it at least had the beneficial effect of forcing scholars
stunned by the outcome to advocate judicial restraint with a fervor not seen
since the Progressives' condemnation of Lochner generations ago.
Notwithstanding the ebb-and-flow of the popularity of Bickel's passive
virtues in the academy, it would be surprising if the concept of procedural
activism did not incorporate the traditional limitations on adjudication that
Bickel described as the passive virtues. Even Gunther, the leading critic of
the passive virtues, did not take issue with the concept of justiciability limits
on the power of the federal courts or with the minimalist notion that courts
should resist the "maximalist" urge, in Sunstein's terms, to decide "too
much." 144 To the contrary, Gunther recognized that adjudication must be
withheld when "the jurisdictional requirements of Article I1I are not met" and
accepted as "sound and of principled content" minimalist doctrines pursuant
to which the Court decides a case on the merits through "avoidance only of
some or all of the constitutional questions argued."'
45
The understandable focus of Gunther's ire was "Bickel's manipulative
use of jurisdictional doctrines" to avoid the merits of a case, not the passive
virtues themselves. 146 To say that traditional justiciability doctrines should
143. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NoTRE DAME L. REV.
1093 (2001); Frank L Michelman, Bush v. Gore: Suspicion, or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 679,
686-89 (2001).
144. See Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 141, at 15.
145. Gunther, supra note 140, at 16-17; see also id. (endorsing the minimalist rules of
constitutional adjudication distilled in Justice Brandeis's famous concurrence in Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936)); id at 20 ("[A]voidance of broad substantive constitutional decisions
without avoiding all decisions on the merits is common Court practice. Much of Bickel's discussion
regarding the choice and desirability of narrower grounds of decision is wise and useful."). I should
add that Bickel's passive virtues, like the Brandeisian minimalist rules, are fully consistent with the
fact that the modem institutional role of the Supreme Court extends far beyond simply deciding who
wins and who loses in particular cases. When issues of constitutional law are squarely presented in a
proper case, both sets of principles permit authoritative resolution by the Supreme Court in
comprehensive, well-reasoned opinions that, in the course of deciding the cases at hand, lay down
principles that will serve as precedent for future cases. See BICKEL, supra note 7, at 235-43, In this
sense, both differ from those aspects of Sunstein's distinctive brand of minimalism that requires the
Court to decide cases through opinions that are "as incompletely theorized as possible," Sunstein,
Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 141, at 99, avoid "deductiven" reasoning, id. at 14, and form
broad rules or "issues of basic principle," id at 20. Sunstein's goal, as he readily admits, is to "force
democracy" by keeping courts out of controversial matters as far as possible and leaving such matters
for resolution by the political branches. Id. at 7.
146. Gunther, supra note 140, at 16 (emphasis added); see also id. at 10 (rejecting Bickel's "neo-
Brandeisian fallacy: ... to assert an amorphous authority to withhold adjudication altogether [is] a
power far broader than any suggested by the examples given by Brandeis, a discretion far wider
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not be manipulated to avoid unwanted but nonetheless mandatory exercises
of jurisdiction does not entail rejection of the passive virtues as improper in
themselves. Consequently, departures from the traditional adjudicative
model enshrined in the Constitution's justiciability limits on federal-court
jurisdiction are properly regarded as procedurally activist even if the
underlying judgment is sound on the merits. 47
This form of judicial overreaching can take several forms. For example,
a court might'decide "too much" by resolving issues that need not be decided
in order to reach a reasoned disposition of the case.148  Similarly, a court
might exceed its authority by granting a remedy that is overbroad in relation
to the constitutional violation found or by remedying a violation in an
unnecessarily intrusive manner.1 49  If the relief ordered is not narrowly
tailored to the violation, then, in a real sense, the court has crossed the line
separating constitutional enforcement from the policy-wonk world of
divining the "best" way to structure institutions of state or local
government.1
50
In light of these considerations, a definition of procedural activism is
possible. A decision is "procedurally activist" if it reaches the merits when
than any that can be independently justified"). An example of the manipulation Gunther criticized is
the use of ripeness doctrine as a basis for dismissing a case that, but for the Court's desire to avoid the
merits, would be deemed ripe. Gunther was right, I think, to reject Bickel's contention that "there is a
general discretion not to adjudicate through statute, Constitution, and remedial law present a 'case' for
decision and confer no discretion [to avoid adjudication]," id at 17, although, as Professor Sunstein
notes, it may be inevitable that "borderline" justiciability questions will be influenced by whether or
not the Court wishes to reach the merits. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, supra note 141, at 52.
Bickel, however, had the better of the argument in terms of cases of discretionary jurisdiction, as to
which the Court is free to deny (and routinely does deny) certiorari on grounds of mere expedience or
merits-based considerations, even if the consequence of declining review is to allow important errors of
constitutional law to stand uncorrected. See SUPa. Cr. R. 10 (providing that "[rieview on a writ of
certiorari is not a matter of right, but ofjudicial discretion" and that the factors listed in Rule 10 are not
"controlling" on the Court). But see Gunther, supra note 140, at 13-14 (arguing that even exercises of
certiorari jurisdiction should reflect principled application of rules governing the grant of certiorari).
147. This approach, however, cannot automatically be applied to state courts, which are subject to
very different considerations. Many state courts are not bound to the justiciability limitations
applicable to federal courts and, as such, may have lawmaking tools, such as advisory opinions, that
are not available to the federal courts. State courts, in other words, may be less ethered to the
traditional common-law method of adjudication than the federal courts. See generally Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L
REV. 1833 (2001).
148. See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 141, at 10-11.
149. This issue is of particular importance in structural-reform litigation. In remedying a violation
of the Constitution, there should be a close fit between the violation found and the remedy ordered;
thus, federal courts have no warrant to impose far-reaching remedies (such as ordering tax increases or
taking over public schools or other local institutions) when less intrusive measures would be sufficient
to remedy the constitutional violation. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974)
(holding that relief across school-district lines in a desegregation case is not Nvarranted absent proof of
an "iterdistrict' constitutional violation and corresponding segregative effect across district lines).
150. For an argument that the line separating rights and remedies is chimerical, see Levinson,
supra note 28.
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the passive virtues would counsel against doing so or resolves more issues
than are necessary, strictly speaking, to reach a reasoned disposition of the
case. In these instances, the underlying result may or not be correct, and may
or may not be substantively activist, yet the decision has been reached
through improper means and therefore should be considered procedurally
activist, wholly apart from matters of substance.
B. Was the Counterrevolution Activist?
I can now consider whether the Counterrevolution by the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts was, in some sense, activist. Applying the ideologically
neutral definition of activism developed in the last section, it is
unquestionable that the Counterrevolution was frequently activist. A few
examples from the habeas corpus context should illustrate the point that those
Courts did indeed resort to activism in undoing the earlier activism of the
Warren Court.
151
Teague v. Lane 52 is a classic example of procedural activism. In that
case, the Court held that, except in two narrow circumstances, "new" rules of
federal law could not be applied on habeas corpus. The difficulty was that
the far-reaching issue decided by the Court was not addressed by the parties
to the case. Indeed, it was discussed only in a single amicus brief, and was
not the subject of any discussion at oral argument. 53  The first time the
parties learned that radical changes were in store for habeas retroactivity
doctrine was when they received the Court's opinion on the merits in Teague.
By then, of course, it was too late for the parties to have any input into the
151. Cases like Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), were, in my view, either in derogation or, or lacking support
in, the constitutional text and thus were substantively activist. Miranda was also a procedurally activist
decision because the Court, in a case where Miranda's lawyers rested only on the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, created an elaborate new regulatory regime for custodial interrogation, grounded on
the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause, based on the Court's own untutored survey of
police interrogation manuals. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 461. Miranda also discussed issues that were not
before the Court, such as the standard for determining whether Miranda rights had been validly
waived; the waiver issue was not ripe because, before Miranda, state and local police did not advise
suspects of what would later become known as their Miranda rights. Id. at 475. Substantive activism
was also afoot in the overruling of established precedents based solely on disagreement with the merits,
as in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See
Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (overruling, inter alia, Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)); Gideon,
372 U.S. 335 (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)).
152. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
153. Justice Brennan's dissent noted: "Astonishingly, the plurality adopts this novel
precondition to habeas review without benefit of oral argument on the question and with no more
guidance from the litigants than a three-page discussion in an amicus brief." Id. at 330 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). It is hombook law that federal courts not only can but must, where the parties fail to do
so, raise questions of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998). Nonretroactivity, however, "is not,...
jurisdictional" but rather a merits defense that is forfeited if not raised in opposition to a habeas
claim. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222,228-29 (1994).
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matter (other than by filing the usual petition for rehearing, which the Court
invariably denies without comment).15
To be sure, easy issues can be disposed of by a court sua sponte, but the
issue of whether habeas review should be withdrawn for new rules was by no
means easy. As such, the prudent course under the circumstances would
have been to ask for briefing on the point or to highlight the retroactivity
issue and leave it for a later day, both steps the Court has taken in other
contexts when it anticipated the possibility of a broader or significantly
different disposition than that urged by the parties. 155 Clearly, the plurality in
Teague was determined to put an end to what it perceived to be longstanding
abuses in habeas corpus and to provide state-court convictions the finality
they were lacking. Whether or not this was desirable can be debated on the
merits, but the claim here is only that it was activist to reach out and take
such a far-reaching step without full adversarial treatment.15
Of the counterrevolutionary habeas cases discussed in Part II, only
two-Wainwright v. Sykes'57 and Stone v. Powell--were substantively
154. Cf. Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalisin, 19 HARV. JL. & PUB.
POL'Y 283, 288 (1996) ("The party's opportunity to make its case, to present its arguments, to
persuade the Court-its opportunity, in other words, to be a genuine participant in the decisionmaking
process-is rendered chimerical because the outcome has already been decided, on the basis of criteria
it neither knew would govern nor could help to shape. What a charade the judicial process then
becomes!").
155. For instance, the Court highlighted, but did not reach, the issue of whether Miranda had been
legislatively abrogated when it first took notice of 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the statute Congress passed in
1968 to displace Miranda as the standard governing the admissibility of confessions in federal
prosecutions. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,457 n.* (1994). In addition, presumably as a
predicate for an overruling in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court, over a four-Justice dissent,
set the case for reargument and directed the parties to brief the question whether Rimnon % McCrary,
427 U.S. 160 (1976), should be overruled. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 485 U.S. 617 (1988) (per
curiam). The outcry from civil-rights groups that Pimnyon, a landmark civil-rights case applying a
Reconstruction-era antidiscriminadtion statute to private actions, might be overruled was so fierce that the
Court ultimately backed down; and it seems fair to suppose that the reason the Court backed down was
its unwillingness to brave the political firestorm as opposed, say, to the strength of the stare decisis
arguments of Runyon's defenders. Whatever the reason, however, after having clearly signaled its
willingness to overrule Runyon absent any invitation from the parties to do so, the Court trotted out stare
decisis as the justification for retaining Runyo,n even though the Court noted its belief that the case was
wrongly decided. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989).
156. Another procedurally activist aspect of Teague was that the plurality purported, in a habeas
case involving a state conviction, to make its new approach to retroactivity applicable to federal
convictions as welL See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (plurality opinion) (holding that a case establishes a
"new" rule if it "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
Governmeni") (emphasis added). The applicability of the "new rule" retroactivity standard to federal
prosecutions not only was not before the Court in Teague but was also less than obvious. Several key
concepts in Teague (comity between federal and state courts and deterring state judges from flouting
federal rights) do not apply in the context of federal prosecutions, and their inapplicability to the
federal context might have warranted a different approach in that context to retroactivity. That the
Court did not even entertain this possibility shows that the federalism and comity rationales in Teague
were mere window-dressing-finality (or, more bluntly put, the view that criminal defendants must
lose) was really the operative concept.
157. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
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activist. Sykes rejected the Warren Court's deliberate-bypass standard for
state-court procedural defaults except for the particular kind of default that
occurred in Fay v. Noia1 59 The main reason given by Sykes for doing so-
that state procedural rules deserved "greater respect" than the Warren Court
had given them -is merely a claim that Fay was wrongly decided. Even if
that were so, however, mere demonstration of error is an insufficient reason
for overturning precedent under current stare decisis doctrine.' 6 1
Perhaps it was recognition of this point that led the Court to characterize
Fay's treatment of the procedural default issue as "dicta,"' 62 but that
characterization is wrong. Given the warden's claim that the Court could not
reach the merits of Fay's claim because it had been defaulted in state court,
the Fay Court was squarely presented with the procedural-default question.
The Court held that, although state-court procedural defaults could bar
review by a habeas court, review would be precluded only when a deliberate
bypass occurred, and (not surprisingly) the Court then proceeded to define
what it meant by deliberate bypass. This is not the making of dicta, any more
than Coleman's across-the-board adoption of the far less forgiving cause-
and-prejudice standard for all kinds of procedural defaults was dicta. In both
cases, the definitions (each of which was highly contestable) were necessary
to the outcome. Rehnquist's effort to avoid Fay thus was disingenuous.
Stone was also a substantively activist decision. The reason is not, as
some have argued, 163 that the habeas statute dictated a different result. As
previously shown, the habeas statute simply authorized issuance of the writ
on federal-law grounds as principles of "law and justice" require, leaving it
to the Court to determine when the writ should issue. 164 The real reason that
Stone was activist is that it was inconsistent with Mapp v. Ohio,165 the case
that applied the exclusionary rule against the states. Stone held that the
exclusionary rule was intended simply to deter Fourth Amendment violations
by the police, and then proceeded to preclude habeas review of exclusionary-
rule claims because it saw "no reason to believe" that the threat of habeas
158. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
159. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
160. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 88.
161. See supra note 128. In contrast, the Rehnquist Court decision dealing the ultimate death
blow to the deliberate-bypass standard, Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991), was not activist
because, after Sykes, the Warren Court's standard could be seen as a "remnant of abandoned doctrine,"
which (somewhat oddly) is recognized as special justification for overruling a case. See Paulsen, supra
note 129, at 1557 (describing this ground for overruling as reflecting the Court's view that "[lit is okay
to overrule precedent if you do it in two (or more) steps"). The "remnant" exception to stare decisis
thus is a sort of "adverse-possession" rule allowing trespasses against precedent eventually to mature
into good title.
162. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 87.
163. See, e.g., Stone, 428 U.S. at 515-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
165. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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review would deter unconstitutional searches.16 Mapp, however, had
identified the "imperative of judicial integrity"--that is, the need to prevent
courts from using illegally seized evidence and thereby profiting from
unconstitutional conduct-as an independent reason for the exclusionary
rule. 167 Stone, therefore, was not faithful to Mapp.
Here, I have given just three examples of activist decisions by the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts drawn from the narrow but important area of
habeas corpus. Broadening the focus to all of criminal adjudication or
criminal procedure as a whole would undoubtedly reveal many more. What
these examples show is that in order to establish what it considered a proper
balance between the policies of habeas corpus and the interest of the states in
finality and the integrity of their judicial processes, the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts chose, on more than an infrequent basis, to resort to activism-not
just in habeas law, but throughout criminal adjudication.'6
IV. Activism As Restraint?
To the extent the Burger and Rehnquist Courts did indeed resort to
activism in revising the Warren Court's code of constitutional criminal
166. Stone, 428 U.S. at 493; see also id. at 492 ('Evidence obtained by police officers in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that the frequency of future
violations will decrease.").
167. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659; see also id. at 657 (describing the "philosophy" of the Fourth
Amendment was to "assure... that no man is convicted on unconstitutional evidence"). To be
sure, the Warren Court itself had emphasized deterrence concerns in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618 (1965), where the Court held that Mapp would not be applied to previously conducted trials.
The Linklener Court's recognition that it would be unfair to apply Mapp to cases resolved under the
prior law, however, did not limit Mapp's broader conception of the purposes of the exclusionary
rule--purposes that were not implicated in Linkletter because, absent retroactive application of
Mapp, the use of the illegally seized evidence was perfectly constitutional. Indeed, even after
Linkletter, the Court held that exclusionary rule claims were subject to postconviction review in
federal prosecutions and assumed, in dicta later repudiated in Stone, that the same rule governed in
habeas cases. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
168. In criminal investigation, the Counterrevolution was more indirect, but no less effective in
reshaping Warren-era doctrine. In criminal investigation, as Professor Carol Steiker has explained,
Mapp and other controversial Warren-era rules of behavior for police doctrines ("conduct rules")
could be, and were repeatedly, negated by adoption of countervailing "decision rules" telling courts
how to respond to antecedent violations of conduct rules. See generally Steiker, supra note 4. This
obviated any real need for the Burger and Rehnquist Courts to overrule the Warren Court's conduct
rules; for example, the many subsequent exceptions created to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary
rule, limitations on standing to raise Fourth Amendment claims, and the prohibition of habeas
review of such claims have taken much of the bite out of Katz and Mapp. Id. at 2504. The same
dynamic took place in Miranda doctrine. See infra notes 203-08. Given that criminal adjudication,
unlike criminal investigation, generally speaks only to one audience (courts) instead of two (courts
and police), there has been less room for using decision rules to change \Varren-era rules of criminal
adjudication. As such, it is not surprising that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts committed more
direct assaults on precedent in criminal adjudication that in criminal investigation. For examples of
such assaults, see, for example, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which overruled Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), and Vainvright r. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), which overruled Fay n.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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procedure, the larger normative question arises concerning the propriety of
the Counterrevolution. Some proponents of judicial restraint might object
that activism, once identified, is by definition unjustified.1 69  This is a
principled position, but not, as I hope to demonstrate, one that will actually
promote judicial restraint. If one is really interested in promoting judicial
restraint, then it may be necessary at times for a court, confronted with prior
instances of activism, to respond in kind so that the pendulum might be
moved back in the direction of restraint, e.g., of adherence to written texts,
Two caveats are in order before proceeding to the argument. First, I
make no claim that activism is defensible across the board. My own view is
that restraint is the proper approach for federal judges to take; this is why I
limit my defense to reactivism, which by definition can occur only after, and
to the extent that, a majority on the Court has already committed a significant
departure from principles of judicial restraint. Proponents of restraint
presuppose that activism is never justified; to the extent that view is adopted
by restraint-minded judges, activist judges, conservative or liberal-who, by
definition, reject judicial restraint as an operative principle-will be left with
a free hand to impose their moral and political values on society through
constitutional adjudication. If that happens, then judicial restraint will
operate, in practical terms, as the handmaiden of judicial activism, and the
Constitution will finally have been transformed into a one-way ratchet.
Second, although the story of the Counterrevolution (and hence much of
the focus of this Article) has largely centered on conservative judicial
activism, it would be unfair to dismiss this effort as a justification for
conservative judicial activism as such. As I hope is clear by now, reactivism
is an ideologically neutral concept. Liberal Justices can use reactivism to
counter earlier instances of conservative activism, just as the Rehnquist Court
has used reactivism to roll back the Warren Court Revolution in criminal
procedure. My aim, therefore, is neither to praise conservative activism as
such nor to bury judicial restraint, but instead to suggest the need to rethink,
to some extent, conventional understandings of judicial restraint. What is
needed, I believe, is a more nuanced view of judicial restraint, one that is
tailored to the realities of constitutional adjudication in modem society. I am
under no illusion that refining judicial restraint along these lines will end
judicial activism-indeed, it will actually require activism in certain
instances-but it should produce an equilibrium closer to the restraint model
than our current system of adjudication. 170
169. See, e.g., Graglia, supra note 99, at 85.
170. Again, it bears emphasis that reactivism does not necessarily push toward less judicial
activity or fewer rights. Where prior courts have underenforced the Constitution-and arguments
have been made along these lines in a variety of contexts, such as to the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Contracts Clause, for example-then, to the extent those prior decisions were
activist in one of the senses I have described, reactivism would result in more aggressive judicial
review and more enforceable rights.
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A. The Problem
A hypothetical may help set the stage for consideration of reactivism.
Imagine that the Supreme Court is asked to decide in Case One, as a matter
of first impression, whether criminal defendants have a constitutional right to
a particular kind of safeguard at trial. After due consideration, the votes are
tallied, and the Court rules six to three for the defendant, concluding that the
right does, in fact, exist. The three dissenters believe the Court's conclusion
to be an impermissible one in light of the constitutional text and file a
vehement dissent.
Sometime later, Case Two comes up, asking the Court to resolve a
Circuit split concerning what defendants need to show in order to make out a
successful claim for reversal based on the right recognized in Case One. The
six Justices in the majority in Case One split among two different tests in
Case Two. Three Justices vote to affirm the petitioner's conviction based on
the strict test applied by the court of appeals, which the petitioner does not
satisfy and which would be very difficult for any defendant to satisfy.
Another group of three Justices endorses a lax test that the petitioner satisfies
and that other defendants could readily satisfy and therefore vote to reverse.
Because a majority is required to control the disposition of the case, neither
the strict nor lax groups can, on their own, decide the case, the disposition of
which will therefore be determined by how the dissenters vote. Let us
further assume that the dissenters, though still convinced that Case One was
an activist decision, believe that the strict test is undesirable on its own terms,
perhaps because it is less workable than the lax test. How should they vote?
Under conventional norms of judicial behavior, the dissenters would
have two options. First, they could reaffirm their prior view that Case One
was wrongly decided and vote to affirm the conviction, urging that the prior
precedent in Case One should be overruled. This is so because horizontal
stare decisis (the binding force of precedent in later cases on the same court
that rendered it) binds the Court "as a whole," not its individual members,
who therefore remain free to file repeated dissents on the same issue despite
the adverse precedent In the hypothetical, this approach would result in a
six-to-three vote affirming the conviction without an opinion for the Court,
with a three-Justice plurality adopting the strict test and the three Case One
dissenters concurring in the judgment on the grounds that Case One should
be overruled.
171. Suzanna Sherry, Justice O'Connor's Dilenmna: The Baseline Question, 39 V M. & MARY L
REV. 865, 870 (1998) ("The stare decisis question asks whether the Court as a whole should overrule
its prior decision.... The dissenting Justice can either concede the point or reargue the issue [in
subsequent cases]. Justices thus may occasionally continue to reject a particular holding of the
Supreme Court from which they dissented, dissenting again and again in every case raising the same
question or issue:'). The most strildng example of this phenomenon, as Professor Sherry recognizes, is
the series of repeated dissents by Justices Brennan and Marshall arguing, in the face of years of rulings
to the contrary, that capital punishment could never be constitutionally imposed. See i.
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Second, if the dissenters are unwilling to advocate overruling Case One,
or if they do but fall short (and they. will because, by hypothesis, they lack
the necessary five votes to overrule Case One), the dissenters could, in
essence, "let bygones be bygones." This would mean that they would
begrudgingly accept Case One as a given and thus proceed to answer the
question posed in Case Two. In that event, the dissenters should, under
conventional norms, adopt the lax test in Case Two because that is the choice
they would make if they were sitting in judgment alone without regard to the
decisional outcome their choice would produce in conjunction with the votes
of other Justices.1
72
Neither of these alternatives, it should be noted, would be terribly
attractive to the dissenting Justices. Most obviously, absent intervening
personnel changes on the Court, it would largely be pointless for the
dissenting Justices to vote in Case Two to overrule Case One. Except in the
rare switch by members of the Case One majority, the dissenters will not
have the five votes in Case Two necessary for an overruling. Under those
circumstances, voting to overrule might have value as a moral statement (as
in the repeated dissents by Justices Brennan and Marshall in capital cases),
but it will not carry the day for their cause. Indeed, doctrinal incoherence
might well result if Justices continued voting their preferred outcomes after
those outcomes were rejected-first-best voting by the Justices might prevent
the Court from assembling a majority or even a clear plurality opinion as to
the reasoning for the disposition, thereby defeating the law-clarifying
purpose of published appellate opinions.
The second alternative for the dissenting Justices in Case Two-
following erroneous precedents to their logical end-would likewise have
little allure. The dissenting Justices would be magnifying the effect of what
they believe to be an erroneous interpretation of the Constitution if they were
required to give the precedent the same robust effect they would give to a
correct decision. As a result, even where they are unwilling to overrule a
precedent they believe to be wrong, Justices will typically respect them only
so far as they go and will not extend them beyond that scope.17 3 There may
172. As Professor Caminker has explained, it would be "unfamiliar" on the conventional view to
examine legal rules for correctness as "rule packages" rather than on an individual basis. Caminker,
supra note 57, at 2346. In other words, each rule (here, either the strict or lax test in Case Two) would
be examined separately and on its own terms to determine whether it is correct or not, without regard to
either the content of other rules that bear on the same general subject (here, the constitutional rule
adopted in Case One), or the voting behavior of the dissenters' colleagues in Case Two. These
principles give rise to what Professor Caminker terms the "sacrosanct disposition constraint on
strategic behavior, a Justice may vote strategically for a suboptimal [i.e., less than highest prefcrrcd]
rule only if her insincere vote leads to the same disposition as her sincere vote would have done." Id.
at 2335.
173. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Athlete As Judge: The Man Who Once Was Whizzer White, 66
U. CHi. L. REv. 495, 500 (1999) ("A judge who feels bound by an unfortunate precedent usually reads
it narrowly. Stare decisis does not require that prior mistakes be extended to new ground."). An apt
example in criminal procedure comes from Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 336 (1999), a case
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be circumstances in which Justices will be willing to extend precedents they
deem misguided, and this happened in several important areas of doctrine
during the Counterrevolution. 74  This response, however, will be unusual;
generally speaking, the choice will be between overruling the precedent or
adhering to it so far as it goes.
Now, imagine that Case Three comes before the hypothetical Court.
This time, there have been personnel changes on the Court, and two members
of the Case One majority have been replaced by Justices who agree with the
Case One dissenters that Case One was wrongly decided. With this
hypothetical turn of events, the Case One dissenters now have an option-
overruling Case One-that they lacked in Case Two. 175  Should the Case
Three majority overturn Case One (and, implicitly, Case Two)? The
staunchest proponents of first-best voting would say that Case One should be
overruled because Justices should always vote their first-best preferences.
76
involving the question whether Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), which prohibited
prosecutorial comment on, or adverse inferences from, the defendant's silence at trial, applies at
sentencing. Rejecting the majority's decision to extend Griffin, Justice Scalia argued forcefully in
dissent that Griffin was the product of "a breathtaking act of sorcery" by the Court and a "wrong turn"
in terms of text and tradition. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 336 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even so, instead of
advocating overruling Grifin, Justice Scalia would not have applied it to sentencing. See id. (arguing
that the fact of error in Griffin "is not cause enough to overrule it, but is cause enough to resist its
extension"). For additional criminal-procedure examples, see Scott it Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 371-74
(1979), which held that the right to state-appointed trial counsel underArgersinger %, Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972), where jail time may be imposed, does not extend to cases where imprisonment will not be
imposed, no matter how necessary defense counsel may be for an effective defense or avoiding
erroneous convictions. See also Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-15 (1974) (holding that the right to
state-appointed counsel on direct appeal under Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), does not
extend to discretionary-review proceedings).
174. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts did, on several notable occasions, extend controversial
Warren-era precedents, such as Miranda and Massiah. See generally Steiker, supra note 4, at 2474-
78, 2480-84. This seems to reflect the Court's commendable desire to have at least a minimally
logical and workable system for implementing Warren Court precedents that would not be ovcrruled.
If, for example, Miranda were to be retained as the standard for custodial interrogation, then it would
make little sense to permit the police to ignore a suspect's unambiguous invocation of his Miranda
rights and continue interrogating the suspect in the absence of counsel until the suspect finally relents
and confesses. See Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477
(1981). According to a recent biography, Justice White systematically voted, in all cases except
abortion, to reaffim---and even extend-rulings he believed to have been wrongly decided, Miranda
included, based on a strong belief in precedent. See DENNIs . HtJTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO WAS
ONCE WHIZZER WHinr A PORTRAIT OF JusTIcE BYRON R. WHITE 369, 389-90 (1998). Dean
Jeffries suggests, in contradiction to Hutchinson, that White may actually have been closer to his
colleagues' "free and easy attitude toward unwelcome prior decisions" than might otherise appear
and may, in fact, have voted to extend unfortunate precedents as a way of bringing home to his
colleagues the full costs of their mistakes. See Jeffries, supra note 173, at 501.
175. The parallels to the Counterrevolution should now be apparent: the Burger Court was
typically in the Case Two situation, lacking the votes necessary for wholesale repudiation of the
Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions, whereas the Rehnquist Court was usually in the Case
Three situation in that, by the late 1980s, it had five Justices who disagreed with just about
everything the Warren Court did in constitutional criminal procedure.
176. Professor Lawson argues that Justices must decide each case based on their flrst-best
interpretation of the Constitution and that it is unconstitutional for them to vote based on prior Court
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For most of the rest of us, however-including Justices on the Supreme
Court-the answer is an unequivocal "it depends."
As previously mentioned, in both constitutional and statutory cases,
current stare decisis rules require "special justification" before the Court can
revisit prior precedent. 177 In doctrinal terms, this would, in turn, devolve into
policy-laden inquiries such as the "workability" of the doctrine of the prior
case or the extent to which overturning the precedent would upset
"reasonable reliance interests," inquiries that cannot be made in the
abstract.1 78 If truth be told, however, these factors are broad enough that, if
the Court really wanted to, it could come up with a reason in Case Three for
overturning Case One. 179 The more pertinent question, therefore, is whether
the Justices would be willing to overrule Case One.
This question is substantially more difficult than proponents of first-best
voting admit. Clearly, overrulings do happen every Term, roughly on the
order of one-and-a-half overrulings, on average, per year over the last two
decades, and so the Justices are willing to revisit prior precedent in certain
contexts.180 Unless we are to assume that a majority of the Supreme Court
only disagrees with two cases a year on average, which seems highly
implausible, the rate of overrulings suggests a general reluctance to overturn
precedent. That Justices would be instinctively reluctant to overrule prior
decisions should not come as a surprise because there are significant costs to
overruling precedent.
Perhaps the most important of these costs is the potential for upsetting
reliance interests on the part of society as a whole. For example, even as he
strongly argued that the Court had so broadly construed the Commerce
Power as to hand Congress a "blank check," Justice Thomas, who has proven
himself to be among the least reluctant on the current Court to overturn
precedent, got cold feet in United States v. Lopez.'8' He lamented that it was
likely too late in the day to return to the original understanding of the
Commerce Clause (which, to him, would have required rejection of the
precedents inconsistent with that interpretation. See Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against
Precedent, 17 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994).
177. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
178. See generally Paulsen, supra note 129, at 1551 (listing factors).
179. Indeed, according to at least one empirical study, modem Supreme Court justices virtually
never subjugate their preferences to the norms of stare decisis. See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J.
Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Decisis on the Votes of United States Supreme Court Justices, 40 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 971,971 (1996) (reporting their conclusion that "[o]verwhehningly, Supreme Court justices
are not influenced by landmark precedents with which they disagree"). Based on this and other
empirical data, Fred Schauer has noted that "there is scant evidence that precedent operates as a
genuine constraint in Supreme Court cases of substantial moral or political consequence." Frederick
Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CIN, L.
REv. 615, 626 (2000).
180. See supra note 140.
181. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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notion that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity based on the
aggregate effect of such activity on interstate commerce), noting in a
footnote that "[c]onsideration of stare decisis and reliance interests may
convince us that we cannot wipe the slate clean."''  Thomas accordingly
called only for the Court to "temper" its Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
and that is essentially what the majority did. 83 Related to the reliance point
is that there are potential costs to the Justice calling for the overruling; costs
to which the Justices are, to varying degrees, quite sensitive. Perhaps the
foremost of these costs is discomfort or reputational harm caused by sharp
scholarly or public criticism. Such criticism would undoubtedly have
occurred if Lopez had ordered, or any Justice specifically called for, a return
to what President Franklin Roosevelt once derisively referred to as a "horse-
and-buggy definition of interstate commerce."'84  Lopez is a powerful
reminder that there are limits to how far even the most aggressive Justices
will go to correct errors they perceive to be flagrant trespasses on the
Constitution, even in areas they consider to be important. Another is
Dickerson v. United States in which Chief Justice Rehnquist-whose main
priority on the Court seems to have been undoing the Warren Court's
decisions in criminal procedure-wrote for seven Justices not only declining
to overrule Miranda, but also firmly establishing it as a "constitutional
182. Id. at 601 n.8; see also id. at 574 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Stare decisis operates with
great force in counseling us not to call in question the essential principles now in place respecting
the congressional power to regulate transactions of a commercial nature. That fundamental restraint
on our power forecloses us from reverting to an understanding of commerce that would serve only
an 18th-century economy... .). Interestingly, Justice Scalia, an advocate of originalism, did not join
Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Lopez, choosing instead to sign onto the majority opinion
without comment.
183. Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring). In light of these cautionary notes sounded in the
concurring opinions, the Lopez majority did not fundamentally rework existing Commerce Clause
doctrine-indeed, not a single case was overruled-but instead took a more limited approach. The
Court held that "noncommercial" intrastate activities may not be aggregated to demonstrate the
requisite "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. Id. at 567. In so holding, however, the Court
went out of its way to endorse aggregation for commercial activities, id. at 559, as well as sweeping
congressional authority to regulate two other "broad categories" of activities. See id. at 558
(reaffirming prior Commerce Clause holdings establishing congressional authority to "regulate the
use of the channels of interstate commerce" and to "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities"). Using its reaffirmed ability to regulate pursuant to these latter
approaches, Congress immediately reenacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q),
invalidated in Lopez, adding a requirement that the gun must have crossed interstate lines at some
point-as, naturally, virtually every (if not every) gun has. See id. § 922(q)(2)(A) (1996) (adding
requirement that the firearm must "ha[ve] moved in ... interstate or foreign commerce").
184. Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Two Hundred and Ninth Press Conference. May 31, 1935, in 4
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLiN D. ROOSEVELT 200, 221 (Samuel L Roscnman ed.,
1938). Even the more limited step the Court took in Lopez drew sharp criticism, as if the Court had
committed some grave sin in suggesting that there am limits to the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Peter
M. Shane, Federalism's "Old Deal": Wat's Right and Wrong with Consen'ti'e Judicial Activism,
45 VnzL. L. REv. 201,209 (2000).
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decision.' i85 Although Justice Scalia saw no reason for "hesitation" at the
prospect of reconsidering Miranda,186 the Court evidently did despite the fact
that the views of Rehnquist and certain other members of the majority on the
correctness of Miranda were undoubtedly closer to Scalia's than Warren's.1
87
It is little wonder, then, that even in the realm of constitutional law, stare
decisis doctrine puts more of a premium on keeping past issues "'settled'
than insisting that they be "'settled right"--less, to be sure, than in statutory
contexts, but a premium nonetheless-and the reason is that the Justices
prefer not to overrule prior precedents.1
88
Some opponents of stare decisis have argued that the cure for this
problem is for Congress to abrogate stare decisis and require the Justices to
decide each case in accordance with their "best present understanding of the
meaning of the Constitution.' ' 89 This, however, would be no cure at all, for
at least two reasons. First, there is no real support for the empirical
assumption that stare decisis acts as a constraint on Supreme Court Justices,
at least in controversial cases.190 There is no reason to think that abolishing
stare decisis rules would change the Justices' behavior if in fact stare decisis
185. 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2001); see also id. at 432 ("We hold that Miranda, being a
constitutional decision of this Court, may not be in effect overruled by an Act of Congress, and we
decline to overrule Miranda ourselves.").
186. Ia at 461 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
187. Reluctance to strike down an icon like Miranda was not the only reason for Justices who
disagreed with the decision to vote to reaffirm it in Dickerson. The conventional wisdom is that the
costs of Miranda, though very real and substantial when the decision took law enforcement nationwide
totally by surprise in 1966, are now low (maybe even "vanishingly" so) because law enforcement has
fully adjusted to the Miranda framework and still achieves confessions in large numbers of cases. See
generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 500, 547 (1996) (arguing that "Miranda's empirically
detectable net damage to law enforcement is zero"). If this empirical assessment is accurate, then the
images of Justice White, the most vituperative of the Miranda dissenters, repeatedly voting to extend
Miranda in later years, see supra note 174, and of Chief Justice Rehnquist writing the opinion
reaffirming Miranda in Dickerson may not be as counterintuitive as they seem at first, and subsequent,
blushes. Needless to say, to constitutional purists who insist on legally correct outcomes, the costs of
Miranda-whether real or imagined, or whether sunk or not-would be beside the point; all that would
matter is that the "right' interpretation of the Constitution be adopted.
188. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997) (noting that stare decisis reflects the view
"'that in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled
right") (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)). Why, then, was the Warren Court so willing to overturn precedent in criminal procedure?
The answer would seem to be that the Warren Court majority was uniquely suited by background to take
an active role in national affairs and to believe itself to be competent to do so. From Chief Justice
Warren-a former governor and presidential contender-on down, the Warren Court majority was
largely composed of individuals who came to the Court with substantial national political experience,
not significant prior judicial service, a trend reversed in subsequent Court appointments. For an
interesting examination of judicial background as it influenced the attitudes of the Warren, Burger, and
Rehnquist Courts, see Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An Interpretation, in THE WARREN
COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POuTIcALPERsPEnvE 28-31 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993).
189. Paulsen, supra note 129, at 1538.
190. See supra note 179.
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rules do not meaningfully constrain judicial behavior in important cases in
the first place.
Second, and relatedly, opponents of stare decisis overlook the critical
fact that stare decisis exists because the Justices are reluctant to overrule
precedent, not the other way around. If a majority of the Justices did not like
stare decisis or found it too constrictive, they would have exercised their
unquestioned power to reject stare decisis rules altogether or to broaden them
to leave greater flexibility for overrulings; after all, stare decisis is a
judicially created doctrine. The Justices have not only failed to take either
step; they have taken the opposite step under the Rehnquist Court, changing
stare decisis rules in ways that make overrulings more (not less) difficult.'9 1
It is impossible to know for certain why this shift has occurred, but a
plausible explanation is strong reluctance on the Court's part to overturn
scores of prior precedents, perhaps even a preference for second-best
solutions as instruments for legal change.1
9 2
To the extent the Justices are instinctively reluctant to overturn
precedent, this reluctance would likely prompt the Court to avoid undesired
reconsideration of previously resolved issues even if stare decisis were
abrogated. Even without the convenient excuse of stare decisis, the Justices'
cost-benefit calculus would still be the same in deciding whether to reject
prior judicial errors. The need to constantly rethink all legal questions anew
in a world without stare decisis would increase the workload of the Justices,
not to mention their own personal exposure to criticism, as Posner has
explained in his recent treatment of judicial motivation.9 3 The Justices
191. See generally Amar, supra note 128, at 81-83 (documenting the shift by the Rehnquist
Court toward more stringent stare decisis rules than reflected in traditional Court practice). This
shift corresponds with the finding of at least one empirical study that, to the extent modem Justices
have rested on stare decisis as a reason for not reconsidering landmark precedents, it almost always
"moved a justice from a conservative to a liberal position." Segal & Spaeth, supra note 179, at 984.
Both phenomena-the greater emphasis by the Rehnquist Court and by conservative Justices generally
on stare decisis--are illustrated by the 'joint opinion" in Planned Parenthood %. Case., 505 U.S. 833
(1992), which offers perhaps the strongest statement from the Supreme Court on the subject of stare
decisis. See generally id. at 854-69 (joint opinion of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.).
192. My treatment of judicial reluctance to reconsider prior precedents is descriptive, not
normative. In my view, the Justices are often too reluctant to correct their prior mistakes. Where a
majority of the Supreme Court is convinced that it erred in a prior case, the Court ought to be more
willing than it typically is to overrule precedent, at least absent strong reliance interests or other
substantial factors counseling adherence to prior rulings. The desire to avoid criticism for their rulings,
though understandable given human nature, is not to be commended. Indeed, the Court's greatest
success story, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), would not have come to pass had
the members of the Court been unwilling to withstand the sharpest of criticism in order to vindicate
enduring constitutional principles.
193. Posuer explains:
[1-f judges considered every case afresh they would, if conscientious, have to work
harder, deciding a case conscientiously without reading the previous decisions would
be like writing a serious, thoughtful article without doing any research to discover what
had already been written on the subject. The judges would also lose the protection
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would directly bear these reputational and other costs while the benefits
would accrue largely to society as a whole. Thus, even if stare decisis were
abrogated, Justices would have strong incentives to behave as if it remained
in effect-which they could do, for example, by hiding behind their
discretionary docket and denying certiorari in controversial areas that might
involve undesired overrulings.'
94
B. Reactivism As a Second-Best Solution
Before illustrating the potential uses of reactivism as a solution to the
dilemmas noted above, it is first necessary to define precisely what
reactivism is. Reactivism occurs whenever a Court responds to the activism
of an earlier decision in ways that are themselves activist. Reactivist
responses can take a variety of forms. It can occur in the form of outright
overrulings in circumstances where the "special justification" demanded by
stare decisis rules as a precondition to overruling is lacking. Reactivism can
also take the alternative form of redressing an erroneous prior decisional rule
by adopting competing decisional rules that counteract the earlier one. This
would include limiting or distinguishing prior precedent in ways that
undermine the precedent, as well as adopting compensating rules, such as
decision rules in criminal procedure, that do not undermine the precedential
value of the earlier decision but nevertheless, in practical terms, reduce the
real-world impact of the decision.
So defined, it is possible to consider how reactivism would create a
more palatable third option for the dissenting Justices in both the Case Two
situation, in which they lack the votes to overturn Case One, and the Case
from criticism and attack that comes from being able to blame an unpopular decision
on someone else (that is, on earlier judges). And there might be more litigated cases
because of the greater uncertainty of legal rights and duties in a system not stabilized
by stare decisis.
POSNER, supra note 97, at 125.
194. Even if the Court's jurisdiction were made mandatory, the Justices could use justiciability
doctrines, such as standing and ripeness, strategically to avoid undesired adjudication, as Bickel urged,
See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 7, at 142-43. There is also the possibility that the Justices would simply
adopt prior interpretations they deem erroneous but nonetheless do not wish to overrule as their own in
order to avoid undesired overrulings. Though inconsistent with norms of judicial candor, such a course
of action would be an effective strategy because most constitutional errors probably do not involve
politically divisive issues but rather are errors that the Court would not feel any burning desire to
correct. The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), where the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of paper money, is a useful illustration: despite substantial arguments, grounded both
in text and original intention, that paper money is unconstitutional, it is unthinkable that, if stare decisis
were abolished, the Supreme Court would throw the nation's economy and banking system into chaos
by overturning the Legal Tender Cases. Cf ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: TIlE
POLITICAL SEDUCrION OF THE LAW 155 (1990) ("Whatever might have been the proper ruling shortly
after the Civil War, if a judge today were to decide that paper money is unconstitutional, we would
think he ought to be accompanied not by a law clerk but by a guardian."). Absent stare decisis, the
more likely result in that sort of case would be that the Court would adopt the prior erroneous decision
as its own, producing what might be viewed as essentially a de facto system of precedent.
1106 [Vol. 80:1057
Activism As Restraint
Three situation, in which they have the votes but are unwilling to overrule
the decision. In Case Three (and all subsequent cases relating to Case One),
the Justices could adopt legal rules that limit the right recognized in Case
One. So, for example, the Justices could hold that the right applies in certain
situations but not others, or adopt rules making recovery for violations of the
right more difficult or limiting the extent of recovery permitted for such
violations. Any of these steps would allow the Justices to "limit the damage"
done by Case One without having to disavow it.
Reactivism offers a palatable solution in the Case Two situation as well.
The Case One dissenters would no longer face an unattractive binary choice
of casting pointless votes to overturn Case One or extending Case One to its
logical conclusion. Instead, they could cast their votes for the strict test, even
though they believe the test to be inferior to the lax test viewed in isolation,
to compensate for the Court's activism in Case One and establish a favorable
precedent in Case Two. Adopting the strict test would, in conjunction with
Case One, more closely replicate the state of affairs that would have obtained
had restraint prevailed in the earlier case.195 In short, despite the fact that
"sincere voting" by the dissenters in Case Two would produce reversal of the
conviction based on the lax test, reactivism would justify them in voting
"insincerely" to produce a precedent in Case Two compensating for the
activist precedent established in Case One.
96
The key insight of reactivism is that Justices should not view court cases
like law school exams, in which the court, like the student, has one chance to
come up with the "right" answer. Rather, many legal issues and doctrines are
interrelated and thus best thought about in relation to one another. Evan
Caminker has called this the "phenomenon of doctrinal complements," and
he rightly cites the New Federalism decisions as an example of com-
plementary thinking about doctrine.197 More than a few of those decisions
seem quite dubious on their own grounds, but may make some sense if,
instead of providing the best answer to the discrete question of constitutional
195. Although a few defendants will prevail under the strict test, and none of them would have
if the dissenters' views had carried the day in Case One, the vast majority of defendants will lose
under the strict test. In the cases where the strict test produces a win for the government, the case
disposition is the same as if the underlying right had been properly rejected in Case One.
196. "Sincere" voting "refer[s] to the vote that represents an individual judge's top-ranked or ideal
judgment as to what constitutes the best response to resolve a discrete legal controversy, without
considering the impact of his vote on the substantive collective result in his court or in other
institutions." Caminker, supra note 57, at 2302. Stated differently, a sincere vote is the judge's first-
best resolution of the case before him, reached without regard to the consequences of his vote on
others. Sincere voting is to be distinguished from "insincere" or "strategic" voting, which captures "a
judge's decision to vote for a disposition that does not truly reflect his 'sincere' judgment in order to
secure the best feasible outcome given the influence of his colleagues in the decisionmaking process."
197. Evan H. Caminker, Context and Complementarity Within Federalism Doctrine, 22 HARV.
J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 161, 169 (1998).
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interpretation before it in any given case, the Court is viewed as trying to
counteract the "blank check" that modem Commerce Clause jurisprudence
has given to Congress.1
98
Indeed, it makes little sense to think about federalism apart from the
scope of the Commerce power because national power and federalism are
flip sides of the same coin. Federalism, in other words, kicks in precisely
where national power leaves off.199 As a result, where prior decisions have
put too much weight on one side of the balance, Justices can move back in
the direction of the "proper" balance by putting a thumb on the other side of
the scale. In the case of the New Federalism, the Rehnquist Court has tried
to counteract what it perceives to be overbroad congressional power vis-h-vis
the states by putting greater weight on the federalism side of the balance
without aggressively constricting Congress's lawmaking power under the
Commerce Clause-a step that, as Lopez shows, even the most ardent
believers in limited federal powers (and the weakest adherents to stare
decisis) on the Court are unwilling to take so late in the day. Of course, the
phenomenon would work just as readily in the opposite direction as well in
that a future liberal majority could undo the New Federalism by expanding
national legislative power.
The clearest case for doctrinal complements would seem to be structural
issues, such as federalism and separation of powers, where the very essence
of the constitutional doctrine is to strike a balance between competing forces
(federal and state governments and the branches of the federal government,
respectively). Is there a broader role for doctrinal complements? The
answer, in my view, is yes.
Beyond structural issues, the complementary-doctrine analysis would
also seem to be generalizable to all right/remedy issues. Such issues are
"inextricably" bound up with one another. 200 A court therefore cannot
meaningfully consider what the remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation
should be, for example, without having a clear sense of what the scope and
essence of the right to be free from "unreasonable" searches and seizures is
or ought to be. Likewise, a court cannot intelligently decide whether a
particular remedy (say, exclusion of illegally seized evidence or an injunction
against future unconstitutional acts) should be allowed without considering
the sufficiency of alternative remedies (such as money damages) for the
constitutional violation.20'
198. See id. at 167.
199. See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("'he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."). I therefore agree with Professor Lawson's broader claim that "[t]he Constitution was a
carefully integrated document, which contains no severability clause." Gary Lawson, The Rise and
Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1253 (1994).
200. See supra note 150.
201. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 259, 282
(1999). Indeed, there is the potential for great mischief, in the form of underenforcement or
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Recognition of these points-in other words, of the relatedness of
strands of doctrine that might otherwise be regarded as discrete-runs
throughout the Counterrevolution. This is the genius behind the use by the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts of conduct rules and decision rules in the
Steiker terminology: those Courts understood that they could take the
"handcuffs" off the police without overruling the Warren Court's conduct
rules. All that was necessary was adoption of the right countervailing
decision rules, which would move real-world litigation outcomes back in the
direction that their own preferred conduct rules would have dictated.?'°2
The evolution of Miranda provides a nice illustration of how this
doctrinal-complement approach has played out, time and again, in criminal
procedure. Notwithstanding their refusal to overturn Miranda, neither the
Burger Court nor the Rehnquist Court would have adopted the Miranda rule
in the first instance. That much is certain. The Courts' unwillingness to
overrule Miranda did not, however, stop them from compensating for the
decision in other ways. For starters, the Court has created exceptions to
Miranda, where failure to give the warnings would not require suppression
of confessions,203 and has adopted a strict definition of "custody" that
generally exempts encounters with police short of actual arrest from the
strictures of Miranda.2' 4  The Court has allowed police interrogators to
overenforcement of constitutional norms, when the Court approaches doctrinally related matters in
isolation. Take, for instance, Fourth Amendment claims. If the state courts refuse to suppress illegally
seized evidence and the defendant is convicted, what are the available remedies for the Fourth
Amendment violation? Such claims cannot be raised on habeas corpus after Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976). Given the cognizability of exclusionary rule claims in criminal prosecutions, a § 1983
action for damages would be barred by the res judicata effect of the adverse determinations in the state
court, see Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980), and the same would almost surely be true of any suit
in state court seeking relief for the illegal search. Even if the res judicata bar could be overcome in the
§ 1983 action, damages would be difficult to recover in the face of police officers' qualified immunity.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). An injunction ordering the prisoner's release
would be preempted by habeas corpus and thus is not an available remedy under § 1983, see Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), and, in any event, restrictive standing rules would make it all but
impossible to secure a federal-court injunction against future illegal searches. See City of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). Viewing the picture as a whole---as the Court apparently has not-it is
open to question whether optimal incentives exist for police to follow the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment. The answer almost certainly is no, given that the chief means of enforcing the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule is so costly (im the sense that it requires exclusion of the evidence
necessary to convict criminals) that judges have a strong incentive to shrink the substantive protection
of the Fourth Amendment--to validate a "bad" search, in other words-to avoid conferring a "get-out-
of-jail-free" card on a dangerous, obviously guilty offender. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Anendnent First Principles, 107 HARV. L REV. 757,799 (1994).
202. See supra note 168.
203. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (holding evidence admissible absent a
prior Miranda warning due to the "routine-booking"-question exception); New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649 (1984) (creating a "public-safety" exception to the Miranda requirements).
204. See generally Quarles, 467 U.S. at 655 (explaining that "the ultimate inquiry is simply
whether there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a
formal arrest").
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disregard "ambiguous" requests for counsel by suspects, 20 5 and has been
quick to find that suspects "reinitiated" contact with the police and thus
vitiated earlier invocations of their Miranda rights.2 6
The Court also adjusted related doctrines in ways that limited the impact
of Miranda on what the Court considered to be fairly obtained confessions.
For example, the Court adopted liberal standards for waivers of Miranda
rights, making it easier for courts to infer such waivers from the making of a
confession following administration of the Miranda warnings.2°7 In addition,
absent physical coercion or threats by the police, courts appear to treat full
compliance with the Miranda warnings as an air-tight guarantee of the
voluntariness of a confession, leaving open the possibility that some truly
involuntary confessions may escape judicial attention.20 8  The Court com-
pensated for Miranda on the remedial side of the calculus, too, holding that
suppression does not extend to use of statements for impeachment purposes
at trial testimony209 or to use, during the prosecution's case-in-chief, of
confessions bearing an insufficiently direct causal relationship with Miranda
violations.210
Given all the Court has done in the decades since Miranda, in
Rehnquist's wonderful, almost self-congratulatory euphemism, to "reduce[]
205. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1994) ("If the suspect's statement is not
an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation [under Miranda
doctrine] to stop questioning him.").
206. In Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983), the suspect clearly said he wanted an
attorney upon being advised of his Miranda rights, and asked the officer taking him from the police
station to jail, "What's going to happen to me now?" Then-Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion
ruled that statement constituted a reinitiation of contact that allowed the police to interrogate him
outside the presence of the suspect's attorney: "There can be no doubt in this case that in asking,
'Well, what is going to happen to me now?', respondent 'initiated' further conversation... [and]
evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was not
merely a necessary inquiry arising out of the incidents of the custodial relationship." See id. at
1045-46 (plurality opinion).
207. Compare, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,373 (1979) (holding that "[ain express
written or oral statement of waiver" is "not inevitably... necessary" and that "waiver can be clearly
inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated") with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 475 (1966) ("[A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after
warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.").
208. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984) (stating that "cases in which a
defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled'
despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are rare");
see generally Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L, REV. 673, 745-46 (1992).
Professor Stuntz argues that Miranda's stiffing of judicial and legislative efforts to delineate "the line
between good and bad police interrogation" is a reason for overruling Miranda. William J. Stuntz,
Miranda's Mistake, 99 MIcH. L. REv. 975, 999 (2001). So viewed, it may well be that reaffirning
Miranda was actually the most "conservative" outcome in Dickerson.
209. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
210. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (refusing to suppress a second confession as
the fruit of an earlier Miranda violation where the second confession was preceded by the Miranda
warnings even though, as a factual matter, the defendant's second confession would not have been
obtained absent the earlier incriminating statements obtained in violation of Miranda).
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the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement,"21' it comes as
no surprise that the Rehnquist Court ultimately saw no need to overrule
Miranda. This is not to say that Miranda had been gutted; where it applied,
Miranda still had teeth, and so the police had (and still have) incentives to
comply with Miranda doctrine in interrogating suspects. Even so, the
adverse impact of Miranda had been blunted in fairly substantial ways long
before Dickerson came to the Court.
212
The end result after decades of case-by-case refinement (and frequently
revisionism) was a considerable change in Miranda doctrine, but not a
complete evisceration of Miranda. Neither Warren nor Rehnquist got to
have his first-best preference. What they did get was a second-best approach
in which the suspect must be given basic information as to his rights and has
the power, by making (and sticking to) an unequivocal request for counsel, to
stop all questioning. Of course, the police have ample latitude to use
persuasion or clever, noncoercive means to cause suspects not to exercise
that power and, ultimately, to make incriminating statements that can be used
against them at trial. 213 After Dickerson, it would appear that Miranda law is
finally at an equilibrium that almost all of the Justices-including supporters
and critics of Miranda-can accept, as shown by the fact that seven of the
nine Justices signed onto without comment an opinion reaffirming both
Miranda and all of the limitations and exceptions adopted over the ensuing
three decades2 14 This is the advantage of reactivism-it provides an effica-
cious means by which a Court that fundamentally disagrees with earlier
precedents, but is unwilling or unable to overrule them explicitly, can move
the law (and, with it, actual case outcomes) back in what it believes to be the
right direction. The legal system and the public thereby gain, to varying
degrees, the benefits of the overruling. At the same time, reactivism allows
risk-averse Justices and the Court as an institution to avoid the unpleasant
consequences of overruling that have historically made Justices so reluctant
211. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443.
212. In fact, so many limitations had been engrafted upon Miranda by the Burger Court (let alone
the Rehnquist Court) that Albert Alschuler surmised back in 1987 that "a police training manual
authored by Justice Holmes' 'bad man of the law"' might advise police officers, in many instances,
that they should "not give [the suspect] the Miranda warnings:' Albert W. Alschuler, Failed
Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1442 (1987) (emphasis
added).
213. Empirical studies have shown that it is "rare" for suspects to invoke their Miranda rights
once questioning has begun. See Stuntz, supra note 206, at 988 (citing survey data). This data
suggest that the police are quite skilled at conducting interrogations in ways that gct the information
they want without resorting to the kind of strong-arm tactics that would cause suspects who were
initially willing to talk to invoke their Miranda rights during questioning.
214. Yale Kamisar is quite right that what Dickerson reaffirmed "is not the Miranda doctrine as it
burst onto the scene in 1966, but Miranda with all its exceptions attached. ' Yale C. Kamisar,
Foreword. From Miranda to § 3501 to Dickerson to...' 99 McH. L REv. 879, 894 (2001). Chief
Justice Warren would be glad, I suppose, to hear that Miranda is now for the ages, but he would not
recognize very much of what we now know as Miranda doctrine.
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to overrule even the most indefensible decisions.215 Thus, the law gets
"fixed" in a way that avoids sharp doctrinal shifts.
The effectiveness of this form of decisionmaking cannot be denied, I
think, in light of the Counterrevolution. A larger question remains: Is
reactivism principled? I believe it is, subject to one important caveat-
namely, that the Justices must always respect constitutional text and structure
when they attempt to counteract earlier erroneous precedents. As indicated
by the wide consensus that the Constitution is law, action by judges in
derogation of constitutional text is indefensible in principle. As long as the
Court stays within the range of permissible outcomes delineated by the text,
however, I believe the Court can and should select the outcome that produces
the best overall result in conjunction with outcomes reached in prior,
doctrinally related cases. This is the constitutional theory of the second-
best.21
6
Professor Lawson has argued that second-best solutions are principled
(and, indeed, "probably right") only if "there is a[] proper role for horizontal
precedent in constitutional theory." 217  In his view, stare decisis is
unconstitutional, and so he sees no place for second-best theory. 2t8 Other
prominent scholars have weighed in on the underlying question of the
constitutional status of stare decisis-most recently Professor Fallon,
215. In this sense, reactivism serves the same purposes as the Warren Court's retroactivity rules
did. By making controversial, law-changing rulings like Miranda and Mapp prospective only-that is,
applicable only in future prosecutions-the Warren Court was able to overrule scores of restrictive
precedents in favor of vastly expanded rights of the accused yet avoid the need to reverse scores of past
convictions obtained in compliance with the overruled precedents. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
& Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1733, 1738-45 (1991). In much the same way, reactivism facilitates legal change by allowing the
Court to ameliorate prior instances of activism without having to bear the costs of explicitly rejecting
activist precedents. Needless to say, however, if the Court is willing to overrule the previous erroneous
precedent, that would be the preferred course to take. After all, there would be no reason to settle for
second-best when the Court to go all the way to first-best. Indeed, to do so would produce unnecessary
costs in the form of greater doctrinal complexity and the attendant risk of confusion among lower
courts: when prior precedents are hedged, limited, and distinguished, the law becomes more complex
than it would have been had the earlier disfavored precedents simply been overruled. Thus, where the
Court is both willing and able to overturn prior precedents deemed erroneous, that is the logical course
to take.
216. Actually, it is a weaker form of second-best theory. In its strong form, the Court would be
justified even in violating constitutional text to compensate for earlier errors that cannot be rectified
directly through overruling. See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the
Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 22
(1994).
217. See Lawson, supra note 199, at 1253 ("If there is any proper role for precedent in
constitutional theory, [second-best theory] is probably right: if an incorrect precedent creates a
constitutional disequilibrium, it is foolish to proceed as though one were still in an equilibrium state.");
see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 126 (1997)
(arguing that "an ideal of what would be first-best should not obscure the practical need for approaches
that are second-best; second-best approaches are sometimes necessary, in practice, for the Constitution
to be implemented reasonably successfully").
218. Lawson, supra note 197.
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strongly defends the constitutionality of stare decisis.219 The constitutionality
of stare decisis is thus rapidly becoming a cottage industry in the literature.
For now, I will leave this interesting debate to the heavyweights. Even
though the justification for second-best theory grows out of a system of
precedent, as Professor Lawson suggests, my claim is that we would likely
have a system of precedent even if stare decisis were declared uncon-
stitutional or abrogated by Congress. Opponents of stare decisis uncritically
assume that judges are reluctant to overrule precedent because of the
existence of stare decisis, but that view is wrong. Judicial reluctance to
overturn precedent is a cause, not an effect, of stare decisis. As such,
abrogating stare decisis would not necessarily change judicial behavior
because it would not change the underlying fact that the Justices strongly
prefer to adhere to prior decisions, even if they believe them to have been
profoundly misguided. Like it or not, in a world where Justices are reluctant
to overrule precedent, reactivism may be the only viable way of correcting
many erroneous interpretations of the Constitution.
The aggressive, behind-the-scenes assault on erroneous precedents that I
have referred to in this Article as reactivism is especially necessary in
criminal procedure and other areas where a single activist decision, like
Miranda, will generate a whole body of doctrine and scores of implementing
cases, both in the Supreme Court and in lower appellate courts, within a short
amount of time. The sheer number of the doctrinal emanations that such a
decision will spin off will greatly magnify the usual judicial reluctance to
reverse course. 220 This "multiplier effect" is especially difficult to counter
with straightforward overrulings, but can be effectively dealt with-as the
remarkably successful course of the Counterrevolution shows-through
reactivism and second-best theory. It is in this sense that activism, of the
"reactivist" kind, actually is restraint, not just in constitutional criminal
procedure but throughout constitutional law and beyond.
219. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 577 (2001) (arguing that "Article IUl's grant of 'the judicial
Power' authorizes the Supreme Court to elaborate and rely on a principle of stare decisis and, more
generally, to treat precedent as a constituent element of constitutional adjudication"); see also Henry
Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUMI. L REV. 723, 754 (1988)
(noting the Article II possibility). For arguments that stare decisis is not inherent in Article 111. see
Harrison, supra note 130, at 513-25, and Paulsen, supra note 129, at 1570-82.
220. As Justice Scalia noted in his Dickerson dissent, "in the 34 years since Miranda was decided.
this Court has been called upon to decide nearly 60 cases involving a host of Miranda issues." 530
U.S. at 463 (Scalia, J., dissenting). That point was certainly not lost upon the majority: overruling
Miranda would have meant undermining literally dozens of other Supreme Court cases and the
elaborate doctrines they spawned governing the manner in which police can conduct lawful
interrogations under Miranda. Even apart from stare decisis, it would be asking an awful lot of the
Court to expect it to overrule so many cases in a single stroke.
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V. Conclusion
At the heart of the Rehnquist Court's criminal procedure decisions, lies
a fundamental paradox: a Court that was the product of a sustained effort by
Republican presidents to reverse high-profile Warren Court decisions that
"handcuffed" the police-decisions like Miranda and Mapp-failed to do so
and, overall, overruled surprisingly few criminal procedure decisions from
the Warren years. Indeed, one of the most significant developments from the
final years of the Rehnquist Court was Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion in Dickerson reaffirnming Miranda, which now, thanks to Rehnquist,
will probably never be overturned.
Two conclusions might be drawn from this evidence. First, one might
conclude that, from the perspective of those who wanted it to wage
"counterrevolution" in criminal procedure, the Rehnquist Court was a
conspicuous failure like the Burger Court before it. Second, one might infer
that the Rehnquist Court has been a model of judicial restraint, dutifully
putting aside its views on the merits and standing by controversial Warren
Court precedents. Both of these conclusions, however, would be seriously
mistaken.
Even without mass overrulings, the Rehnquist Court has been
remarkably successful in fundamentally reshaping Warren Court criminal
procedure doctrines. Following the lead of the Burger Court. the Rehnquist
Court changed the law through strategic use of second-best solutions to
minimize the impact of Warren Court doctrines on law enforcement practices
that the Rehnquist Court deemed legitimate. Miranda was transformed from
a doctrine that "would almost-but-not-quite abolish police interrogation"
221
into a doctrine that now poses little obstacle to police success in the
interrogation room. Similarly, whereas habeas corpus had previously
presented a serious threat to the finality of convictions and the ability of
states to enforce the death penalty, the Rehnquist Court made successful
habeas petitions a rarity and executions all too common.
Regardless of what one ultimately thinks about the Rehnquist Court's
vision of criminal procedure, the story of the Counterrevolution carries
broader lessons for adjudication. Given the natural judicial reluctance to
overturn prior precedents, second-best solutions, such as those employed by
the Rehnquist Court, are both essential and principled. Those who truly
believe in judicial restraint-and, again, note that restraint might further
liberal or conservative ends222-- should recognize that second-best solutions
such as reactivism may often be the only way of producing results that
replicate those that would have been achieved had earlier Courts practiced
restraint. Having an alternative means of "fixing" the law when the Justices
221. Stuntz, supra note 206, at 979.
222 See supra Part I.
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are unwilling to resort to the first-best solution of overruling makes it more
likely that the law will in fact be "fixed."
Moreover, there is value in second-best solutions even apart from
judicial reluctance to overrule precedent because of the manner in which
second-best solutions operate in comparison to overrulings. Overrulings are
all-or-nothing solutions-the preferences of the side with at least five votes
are written into law, and the dissenters' contrary preferences go completely
unfulfilled. It is inevitable, however, that the balance of power on the Court
will swing back and forth over time, as it did with the rise and fall of the
Warren Court. Even though overrulings are proper and should probably occur
more frequently than they presently do, a regime in which every Court
majority were obligated or felt free to overrule every prior decision it deemed
erroneous would inject great instability into the law and risk all-out ideological
warfare on the Supreme Court.
By contrast, second-best solutions such as reactivism tend, over time,
toward equilibria. Unlike overrulings, second-best solutions allow both
sides, in a sense, to win to some degree. This state of affairs, in which both
sides get their second-best preferences (or something close to it), gives each
side a stake in maintaining the status quo and, to that extent, will tend to
promote doctrinal stability. Of course, some degree of instability will occur
when Court personnel changes, but the attendant shifts in doctrine are more
likely to occur in a fairly narrow intermediate range rather than from one
polar extreme to another, the type of swings that overrulings produce.
The evolution of Miranda and habeas corpus is instructive on the
tendency of second-best solutions to produce doctrinal equilibria. In
Dickerson, Miramda supporters and opponents signed onto a majority opinion
that reaffirmed Miranda and all the limitations engrafted upon it. In this
compromise state of affairs, Miranda provides some protection for suspects
(they will be told their rights and, if invoked, questioning must cease) but not,
from the perspective of the police, too much protection. We see a compromise
state of affairs, too, in habeas corpus: habeas is not nearly as potent a remedy
as the Warren Court wanted, but it is also true that habeas remains
considerably broader than it was before the 1950s (when only "jurisdictional"
defects could be remedied). In each context, second-best solutions produced
legal change in situations where overmlings would have been at best
impracticable and in ways that should prove to be more stable over time than
simply overturning Miranda and Warren-era habeas rulings would have.
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts got the message in criminal procedure
decades ago, and things are rosy again for law enforcement and the law-and-
order-minded public as a result. The only question is when will the academy
catch on?
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